Manifestationism: A Truly Meta-Philosophy

One of the CEO’s key aims is to investigate the new field of ‘Manifestationism‘. Manifestationism is (like much of the work here) partially inchoate. Of course one could readily argue that all concepts are partially inchoate, this relates to their nature as coherent incoherence. Manifestationism states that all the ways in which being discloses stay in a kind of competition for dominance. All philosophies (science in its various forms included) as such are manifestations. Agents work for manifestations to try to keep them going or even raise them to dominance (in this case the agents are specifically for these ontological systems, as opposed to agents for less ambitious structures like ‘book binding’). No particular manifestation can actually out compete the others, realism will never defeat idealism and vice versa. This is so because the Narp necessarily is structured by agnostic disjunctions which render it incapable of definitely putting to bed any given manifestations. Manifestations use criteria, a priori and a posteriori to give themselves power within Narp pneuminosity.

It is interesting to note in this way that this is not a philosophy like Deleuze’s or Badiou’s that argues for being as pure multiplicity (difference). Rather manifestationism states that generating a philosophy of difference in itself or mathematically irreducible multiplicity simply generates two more manifestations. These manifestations then have their various agents that work for them to promulgate them. In this way manifestationism is a truly meta-philosophical perspective which is quite hard to deny. Why is it hard to deny? Because to deny it renders the agent of any other ontology as dogmatic as what would be considered by many unreasonable dogmatics (religion). In denying manifestationism one must assert that your ontology is correct and other Narps should submit to this. Of course that’s exactly what the agents of various religions and sciences do assert. One appeals to transcendent or pneuminous interference criteria to bolster their claims and the other to umbratic restraint. The criteria of umbratic restraint currently hold better sway hence the science agents hold the key pneuminous territories. To make themselves more accessible to science agents, religions at least partially allow themselves to be compatible with sciences. But of course even within science as a field for establishing ‘knowledge’ multiple ontologies compete for territory. The situation is truly bewildering in complexity. The denial that there are competing ontological regions might be made of faith (even scientific faith) but given that the agent is only working on the basis of ultimately incoherent criteria, it is ultimately only faith. Manifestationism cannot be denied without asserting dogmatic ontological monism. Even the nagging sense that there is a reality we can uncover (umbratic restraint) is just a manifestation. The manifestation that there is only one manifestation is just a manifestation that (because of agnostic disjunction) can never gain full dominance. Manifestationism is either psychologically true or ontologically true, no revelation can resolve this disjunction, there are just the agents of the different manifestations.

The crucial issue for the CEO’s work is whether manifestationism entails pneuminosity. It would seem this is impossible as pneuminosity itself would just be one more manifestation. Yet we believe a disjunctive description of  either localised pneuminous accretions (restricted to the Narp, and passed between in them in semiotic systems) or a the magickally compatible free floating pneuminous accretions (capable of action both within the Narp space-time and able to bypass it) gives the best description of the relation between manifestationism and the Narp experience. Needless to say though we employ the term Narp, we are aware it too is itself the product of a manifestation.

“We too are agents.”

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