Manifestationism is not just a meta-philosophy, it is also a meta-theory for any phenomena. Arguably at the level of accretions, manifestationism works to postulate the identity of anything we isolate with a name. That is, when words become definitionally functional they serve as a theory for a phenomena which we presuppose in common use. I suppose this liquid is water, but it might be vodka. Clear cut cases pose little problem, the dominant accretion wins quite easily. It might be harder in some instances e.g. to tell whether something is plastic or stone and of course both plastic and stone can be broken down into many sub-items. The criteria might support stone or plastic in different measure until some definite characteristic is unearthed and we say ‘it turns out it was plastic’. There are no criteria to invoke extreme scepticism so we are usually happy with such an epistemic outcome. Simple examples like this show the competing nature of conceptual entities for the territory.
However as mentioned, in philosophy there are no discoveries that decide something with this kind of satisfaction. There are new dialectical developments, but often the old dialectical components continue to hang around to continue further competition with their supposedly more advanced counterparts. Manifestationism shows an competing system of different philosophies with no possibility of a winner. This is unlike science where clear criteria for the successful destruction of a concept can sometimes be achieved -or at least an extreme loss of its agents, possibly to none (though no falsification is total).
One interesting case is that of art and the notion of authorship. The endless debate as to whether or not the authors meaning should be privileged is highly characteristic of an agnostic disjunction. There is only the agents of the different positions contesting what constitutes the meaning of the work with no way to determine if either one is ‘correct’. This is a fascinating instance in which a regional ontology (of art) finds itself constituted by conceptual war. The amazing term ‘real meaning’ is literally fought over. What fights over it? We immediately uncover another agnostic disjunction: either individual autonomous selves fight over it or vast conceptual entities controlling the Narps. An almost paradoxical position emerges: if autonomous individual selves exist then some of them are arguing for themselves not to be privileged in the meaning of art, yet if the control is held by pneuminous entities then [some of] the pneuminous (concept) creatures themselves are arguing for individual selves being the source of meaning [of art].
What are we to make of this? There seems to be an asymmetry that might work in favour of pneuminosity here. For if we try to flatten the situation in either direction it only works in one. That is, to at least gain a glimpse of the possibility of resolution let us try to see what the situation would be like if we admitted each one the victor.
So if we hypothesise that individual autonomous selves (incoherent I know, but let’s bear with it as kind of heuristic), with each one being in control of the conceptual apparatus at its disposal, are the beings that argue over the territory, what does this entail? The first problem is to ask: what is this conceptual apparatus that they control and what are they that they are something separate from the conceptual apparatus? In this model the concept is not autonomous, it is something under the control of a separate self. But it doesn’t seem clear what the self is apart from the concepts, it seems it must postulated as a kind of transcendental ego. Something must be postulated to autonomously control the concepts.
If however we hypothesize the pneuminous accretions control the Narps then when we ask what is the self? The answer is simple, it is just another pneuminous accretion (the self reflective or neurotic accretion). The site that we call the self is just a site of competing accretions (again a regional manifestationism). Option 2 (pneuminosity) does not need a transcendental ego. In this version we are able to flatten the ontology to pneuminous accretions (concept creatures) all the way down.
This doesn’t settle the matter, but by Ockham’s razor it gives it one more criterion in its armour. If we did tentatively accept the accretions theory does this effect the war of art-authorship? If we play with strong pneuminosity (actual magickal connectivity) we do not get an answer but we maybe find some illumination. We might not be able to say the authors meaning is the real meaning, but we could say that the orginal Narp’s pneuminous threads will be forever attached to the accretion of that particular work of art, they necessarily form part of its genesis. If there are pneuminous fibres of intention there, these too will still be present. In this way the theory of mass conceptual creation ironically has some support for direct authorial connection that maybe should be respected. That being said, of course even if that side of the disjunction were true, it is an agnostic disjunction precisely because no one can tell. This means that people do project their own meanings on to works. At a pneuminous level there may even be some resistance from the art-accretion itself, however a vast proliferating system of interpretive fibres from Narps will inevitably attach themselves to the work becoming part of its accretion.
In pneuminosity the author is there, always present in the work and if they had a specific meaning intended for the work, this too endures (though obscured), yet the accreted crust of artistic hermeneusis cannot be said to not be part of the stucture of what is now the incoherent whole.
What phenomenon could illustrate the pneuminous accretion better?