Taking a step back then from any particular ontology seems to be able to retain the notions of assimilation and accretion. Not only this but as is intimated here the notion of pneuma might also escape a particular manifestation. This pneuma though would not be that magickal pneuma but a restricted sense of information that has no bent towards any ontology. Information sounds like an ontological commitment. I’m not sure it has to be, we just have to be clear to not conflate idea and pneuma.
We might want to doubt the all encompassing claims of a purely informational ontology but to do so precisely moves us into a particular manifestation i.e. that acceptance of a materiality beyond ourselves. This isn’t particularly problematic for any phenomenology. The idea is just folded back in as a phenomena. But the nature of what it is that is disclosing all of this is entirely opaque except that things are happening that we understand in a certain way.
There is no bedrock. Of course ‘happening’ is a kind of manifestation. Things ‘are’, things ‘move’. Even that there are things at all is a manifestation undecided as a real ontological ground -their might be only one disclosed as many by the Narp field. But even that there is no bedrock is wrong. That there is no bedrock is a ‘manifestation’. There are agents for the bedrock and agents who don’t believe in the bedrock.
We need to consider manifestationism not in its nebulous form i.e. the notion that there are competing ontologies, but rather what are or does it make sense to point out the most primordial manifestations. Is it possible that the agnostic disjunction ‘magick obtains or does not obtain’ is possibly the most primordial. Maybe this is ill posed. It is not that this disjunction is primordial but rather that a world view the encompasses magick, albeit in a structured form, is primordial. The assimilation that actions, thoughts do interact with the seemingly external stuff is surely dominant until relatively recent scepticism makes inroads against it. The manifestations of ‘magick obtains’ and ‘magick does not obtain’ become a backdrop battle ground over which the other manifestations compete with each other. What we call knowledge only occurs within the latter half of the disjunction. This is empowering to it and rightly so. Yet the former side remains exactly what it is, the other side of an agnostic disjunction. These are not dialectical, they are just agnostic disjunctive. They are epistemological impasses.
Any idealism, monism, materialism, dualism, realism must ally itself to this disjunction one way or the other. If it fails to do so, it fails to be an adequate ontology for the question of magick must be pronounced upon. Every philosopher is an agent for some ontology.