What am I assimilating?
What is assimilating me?
What does this mean?
In the first person phenomenological conscious register that we accept, we can divide thinking into two directions: the first is a kind of Heideggerian notion: what is our thinking directed towards? Why do these thoughts have special purchase for me? The second direction is the awareness that consciousness flows through me hence I am in a sense in the middle of thinking; I am already affirming a train or mode of thought when I am thinking; if I am worried about my friend Emma I have to ask skeptically what the value of emma means, whether she is indeed an object for this thinking etc.
Note that these two directional ways of thinking do not deal directly with the problem of an external world or even a substantial self. This bracketing is hence phenomenological in character. The questioning is Wittgensteinian in style also because any metaphysical nominalism of a realm beyond the human or an external real world is simply characterised as whether such content can be mobilised within the sphere of assimilation (within a sphere of meaning and use). Assimilation is only ever charting the developments or unfoldings of meaning as use through tracking the processes that such meanings and uses disclose in first person consciousness.
To be assimilated by thoughts is somewhat the standard in philosophical discourse since Wittgenstein, Heidegger and others (conceptual shot-through-ness). However, to assimilate thought is less acceptable. In the act of thinking – similar to the appropriation of thinking – it is not so much the content of the thought itself (content qua content) but rather why or how such content of thought finds form, meaning and use through the ‘subjects’ ownership of that thought. This at first may sound simple; thought is made meaningful when a subject uses it to her/his advantage. Yet it is not always for our advantage (sometime it is to our detriment like the neurotic).
Also we cannot separate the subject from the thought itself; there is no cause to do this philosophically. Instead we have an immanence whereby all our thoughts already seem to be formed as ours whether we want or acknowledge such. We soon find that there is no character of thought that is not always already complicit in an act of becoming actual. When we say becoming actual we do not wholly mean in a Deleuzian sense. What we mean is more quasi-psychological; thought needs to involve itself in a mechanism (the subject) whereby it brings about a meaning and use at the same time as it exists. Thoughts have to be assimilated, accretions have to have information actively charged within themselves. This could be an argument for an absolute relativism; every thought necessarily must relate to another thought or the trajectory that it itself has hypostatised. There is a nice wink to Freestone here as this suggests that any thought about something outside of thought is itself carnated with an active use or potential to it (returning itself back to the dynamics of assimilation (or accretion)). Yet not all assimilations have to have direct contact with another. The sensuous experiences of the qualities black, red or rough only have to relate to each other by contiguity (or conjunctive synthesis) through the assemblage of my own mind; they do not actually relate anymore than I relate to Neptune.
This is where the theory of the narp comes in (neurotic accretion regional processor). The narp is always in the face of at least one disjunction; the belief in the assimilation (the belief that I am interacting with a world where the thoughts in my head have purchase in or towards a reality) OR the refusal of it. Either way, the assimilation will take what it can get hold of. Notice that believing in the assimilation does not necessarily mean believing in a solid-world or a reciprocal world, it only means that the subject believes in the process of meaning-as-use.
When we accept assimilations of thought and its effect upon objects and such we then rely less on the initial impetus of the assimilative thought and more on the nominated objects whos job it is to reflect such thoughts back to us (‘accretions’ in my terminology). ‘Objects’ become pointers for concepts, caricatures of concepts that almost always need developing, reworking/re-assimilating.
Can these pointers affect other pointers? In other words can quasi-autonomous signs (or objects) affect each other? The question has already in a sense been answered; if the idea (the assimilation) has been made whereby such could be the case then things will appear to function through that belief.
This philosophy leaves space for a myriad of phenomena even though it initially is split into the two dynamic poles I stated at the beginning of this text. What if a prior assimilation still feels worthy of meaning when an individual or society has deemed it redundant?
Touching an object (i.e interacting with assimilations and further assimilating) is like playing with fire. At the peripheries of the object the assimilation will transcend it. Meaning-as-use- now has no need for its ‘physical’ restraint and can signify to the subject in horrific ways (the neurotic). Don’t forget – the mind ‘itself’ is meant to be assimilated as an ‘object’ yet its assimilative qualities always far outstretch it!!!!!