Manifestationism

Centre for Experimental Ontology

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This is a compilation of thoughts written around 2020-2022 on the meta-philosophical position described as manifestationism.

Graham Freestone

Manifestationism: A Truly Meta-Philosophy

One of the CEO's key aims is to investigate the new field of 'Manifestationism'. Manifestationism is (like much of the work here) partially inchoate. Of course, one could readily argue that all concepts are partially inchoate, this relates to their nature as coherent incoherence. Manifestationism states that all the ways in which being discloses stay in a kind of competition for dominance. All philosophies (science in its various forms included) as such are manifestations. Agents work for manifestations to try to keep them going or even raise them to dominance (in this case the agents are specifically for these ontological systems, as opposed to agents for less ambitious structures like 'book binding'). No particular manifestation can actually out compete the others, realism will never defeat idealism and vice versa. This is so because the Narp necessarily is structured by agnostic disjunctions which render it incapable of definitely putting to bed any given manifestations. Manifestations use criteria, *a priori* and *a posteriori* to give themselves power within Narp pneuminosity.

It is interesting to note in this way that this is not a philosophy like Deleuze's or Badiou's that argues for being as pure multiplicity (difference). Rather manifestationism states that generating a philosophy of difference in itself or mathematically irreducible multiplicity simply generates two more manifestations. These manifestations then have their various agents that work for them to promulgate them. In this way manifestationism is a truly meta-philosophical perspective which is quite hard to deny. Why is it hard to deny? Because to deny it renders the agent of any other ontology as dogmatic as what would be considered by many unreasonable dogmatics (religion). In denying manifestationism one must assert that your ontology is correct and other Narps should submit to this. Of course that's exactly what the agents of various religions and sciences do assert. One appeals to transcendent or pneuminous interference criteria to bolster their claims and the other to umbratic restraint. The criteria of umbratic restraint currently hold better sway hence the science agents hold the key pneuminous territories. To make themselves more accessible to science agents, religions at least partially allow themselves to be compatible with sciences. But of course even within science as a field for establishing 'knowledge' multiple ontologies compete for territory. The situation is truly bewildering in complexity. The denial that there are competing ontological regions might be made of faith (even scientific faith) but given that the agent is only working on the basis of ultimately incoherent criteria, it is ultimately *only* faith. Manifestationism cannot be denied without asserting dogmatic ontological monism. Even the nagging sense that there is a reality we can uncover (umbratic restraint) is just a manifestation. The manifestation that there is only

one manifestation is just a manifestation that (because of agnostic disjunction) can never gain full dominance. Manifestationism is either psychologically true or ontologically true, no revelation can resolve this disjunction, there are just the agents of the different manifestations.

The crucial issue for the CEO's work is whether manifestationism entails pneuminosity. It would seem this is impossible as pneuminosity itself would just be one more manifestation. Yet we believe a disjunctive description of either localised pneuminous accretions (restricted to the Narp, and passed between in them in semiotic systems) or a the magickally compatible free floating pneuminous accretions (capable of action both within the Narp space-time and able to bypass it) gives the best description of the relation between manifestationism and the Narp experience. Needless to say though we employ the term Narp, we are aware it too is itself the product of a manifestation.

"We too are agents."

Manifestationism

Autonomous incoherent ontologies compete for territory. Narps work for the ontologies as agents. Some narps even work for manifestationism. Here's the interesting bit: Narps that deny manifestationism don't even know they're narps (they don't think there are *any* narps). Having said that, of course narps are only disclosed by certain ontologies. It can get confusing.

Manifestationism's advantage lies in the fact that it accepts the existence of the ontologies that would deny its existence. So in assessing what you might want to go with, the option is either a pluralism of competing ontologies or a single ontology that denies the possibility of others. If it says it doesn't deny the possibility of others, then its just manifestationism in disguise because it tacitly is telling you that its just the ontology in charge of your narp but there may be other options.

Manifestationism is a meta-philosophy that is also tied to the work at the CEO regarding the assimilative accretions of pneuma.

Manifestationism and Accretive Ontology -Summarising notes.

Where does this all leave us? We have on the one hand a paranormal supporting philosophy (phenomenology): Pneuminosity. Built on the back of synchroncity it says that information can autonomously interfere with a the necessary idea of the solid (the umbratic). By an Occam's razor like implication all phenomena become informational and constituted in the same way that magick occurs. Human selves become accretions of pneuma like everything else.

But this is *not* posited as the definite view of things. This is posited as the most rational perspective for paranormality because it (I think) successfully deals with so many aspects of it (it's basically chaos magick expanded into an generalised ontology of regular things as well). The whole foundation of all of this is not a foundation, its a disjunction, the agnostic disjunction.

The agnostic disjunction of paranormality/normality is an attempt to show a kind of parity between the believed experience paranormal phenomena and its sceptical opposite. When the strong rational voice thinks it has dismissed the phenomena, it hasn't precisely because the level of doubt invoke is right up there with extreme Cartesian doubt. Something that is ordinarily wrong can have extra evidence shown against it. Repetition etc. can show how the phenomenon does not repeat. In the paranormal phenomenon this has no traction because the lack of repeatability is built into it as is the potential for wild local reality fluctuations.

The agnostic disjunction invokes manifestationism. Any theory of a region or totality that is sufficiently persuasive to gain any foothold and resists empirical refutation is a manifestation. We have a picture of competing manifestations and no real way to progress with the description without lapsing into a particular manifestation. It is reminiscent of Laruelle's 'philosophical decision' without wanting to be non-philosophy.

The consideration of the manifestationist position is the only way forward. The only problem is: what *is* the way forward?

Manifestationism: General Notes

These really are notes. I'm totally aware that most of the interest herein is for the paranormal related writings, I would point out however that unless one accepts a magickal ontology blindly, then something like manifestationism follows as a wider picture. It does sound like more regular (meta)philosophy but that's because that's what it is. The whole point of this project is that magick taken seriously has wide epistemological implications.

1. Manifestationism is empirically driven insofar as it pays attention to the fact that no given ontology has been able to totalise the territory. Of course there are many relatively stable knowledge claims. The chief empirical realm for manifestationism is philosophy - which is notorious for failing to establish anything. The manifestationist claim would probably be that other kinds of epistemic claims are not immune to the problem of philosophy, they are just *less* prone to them.

2. Manifestationism must in this sense presuppose an ontology of concepts with permeable borders. It is in this sense self defeating. It begs the question insofar as it presupposes that knowledge is of a certain nature in order to show the consequence of this. This is a legitimate criticism, however manifestationism can still go through under this presupposition as it represents an ironically extremely stable notion. This notion is that of incoherence. A notion that natural language concepts are well defined would deny a strong version of manifestationism. This too is of course a manifestation. We might want to say that no one would believe such a thing, that no one could be an agent for such an idea, yet we know this is possible. This creates a further irony: Manifestationism is founded on the idea that theories cannot agree and cannot remove each other (to a greater and lesser degree) because concepts are incoherent in their nature. The problem with it is that is possible to have a manifestation that denies manifestationism. Such a manifestation denies the ground on which it is founded. Such a manifestation is necessarily only a competitor for the nature of concepts. Yet by its existence it shows manifestationism failure of self grounding, subjecting it to its own problem. The irony is in the fact that it is a manifestation of stability that destabilizes the picture.

3. Manifestationism proposes that the answer to any form of enquiry is a competing ontology (manifestation) amongst others. Sometimes this dominance is quite extreme.

Horizons on which phenomena are interpreted:

- Scientific horizon: Certainty in one register is altered in others e.g. element behaviour in different atmospheric conditions (water boils at different temperatures at different pressures. This is generally the most stable epistemic arena.

- Linguistic horizon: When one uses a word, we don't know what kinds of vector might fulfil the use meaning in the future.

- Metaphysical horizon: No propositions of any grammatical certainty exist in this realm. All such phenomena are agnostic disjunctive. Keeping ADs open requires that the phenomena not be closed down easily by rational competing ontologies. Powerful paranormal experiences need *very* convincing rational reductive explanations to remove them (the classic contention here being that at least for synchronicity this is not possible). Is 'metaphysical' sufficient for a catch all phenomena in this bracket? Are there grounds to differentiate theological issues from paranormal ones. Theological issues in some sense arise from pure faith, however they often presuppose historical paranormal phenomena that act as grounding events for the faith. There is a kind of difference that maybe warrants a subdivision system: Metaphysical: I) Theological II) Paranormal. Even though in practice the difference is minimal. Extreme putative reality altering can result in extreme manifestations taking over. Psychotropic substances can provide criteria for accepting various metaphysical ontologies.

- Social horizon: What happened in day to day events? Who took the cheese? There is a temporal horizon for such phenomena insofar as whatever has happened recedes. We consider these problems as operating under regular reality criteria -circumstances must be extreme for us to start to consider a ghost took the cheese.

- Awareness horizon: What is the status of being that is not within our awareness? Is being in the dark different to being in the light? Two different but related problems that show the connectedness of darkness and the umbratic. That is, light can still be out of our awareness.

- Trust horizon: Naarps trust the accounts each other give of phenomena. This occurs in all spheres. Direct perception is a special case that pertains to the general issue of magick insofar as they believe they should not readily doubt their own experience. The problem is that their own experience is already governed by various occupying manifestations. What do they mean when they say they trust themselves?

In the site we call the Naarp, how is it determined which manifestations successfully occupy the territory? Is it possible to say anything about this without ascribing an ontology to the self?

Some basic manifestations of the self are:

- the soul which contingently occupies the body
- the soul which necessarily occupies the body
- the self which is formed by empirical relation to the body and experience (broadly nuture)
- the self which is determined largely by the body (broadly nature)
- the self which is in roughly equal parts bodily determined and experientially so
- the epiphenomenal self which is not real as such but just an appearance of a controlling self
- no self, multiplicity of powers occupying a region
- cogent self as a power competing amongst others in a region

Manifestationism cannot solve the problem of the self or any problem of positive epistemology. This is not its purpose.

The temptation is to forge a quasi manifestationist philosophy that allows a number of presuppositions e.g. the incoherence thesis and the accretive thesis. These accepted the pneuminous accretive theory is a cogent manifestation of all phenomena. It does then though become dicatorial in paranormal acceptance. This seems wrong and dogmatic which returns the manifestationist agenda by the agnostic disjunctive door. That is any acceptance of paranormality must also face the possibility of its not obtaining (alternative explanations).

Temporal Manifestations

Two spheres of time are disclosed within the pneurotic sys[tem]. One manifestation shows an picture of a-temporality in which all events happen simultaneously and all pneuma is preserved in its allness for ever. Regional processors in this kind of region are geared to housing neurotic accretions that have a temporal locatedness and a spatial locatedness. Narps have some choice over over one of these, the other they do not. This Spinozistic manifestation is powerful and seductive (seductive too to pneurosis). There is however something about it that is unsatisfying to the experience of Narps.

As Narps form accretions and more importantly when they re-accrete old structures (and by implication de-accrete the old accretion), they do not like the feeling that the old accretion has not been supplanted but just hides as powerful as it ever was. The time sphere of the present and future are filled with the possibility of the improved accretion, not the endless baggage of the old. Therefore, in manifestation at least the present-and-moving-forwardness-in-time of a Narp shows the old accretion resisting but being dissembled, an actual happening in the pneuma, which can be experience by the Narp's new interpretation of things. This is interesting because it means the pneuminous accretions are not just a-temporal but also temporal. What suggests their a-temporal nature is the fact that we can access them, unlike umbratically bound pneuma, which may not be accessed without a time-machine.

Manifestationism: Thoughts

Disentangling pneuminosity and manifestationism is not easy but it seems in some sense this must be done. They are not the same thing. Pneuminosity is a philosophy that accepts the substantialisation of information as ontologically effect (pneuma) on the acceptance of the 'magick obtains' option out of the agnostic disjunction 'magick obtains v magick does not obtain'. Manifestationism is a meta-philosophy that sees different ontologies as competing for dominance of the territory. Manifestationism posits the total space of ontologies as essentially agnostic disjunctive: no manifestation can deliver the knockout blow to the others.

Here comes the complication: the reason no manifestation can outmanoeuvre the other others is owing to the limited perception of the Narp. Its regionality means it is capable of doubting what is not immanent to it (and even doubting what is immanent to it given the right

circumstances). This does mean manifestationism is a meta-epistemological position. It does allow the possibility that one of the manifestations might make better predictions than the others and that in fact if we *could* know it we would see that one of them was correct and many others false. However it bars the notion that we can ever know which one is correct and states that there will endlessly be a proliferation of ontologies fighting for the space (religious, scientific, magickal, phenomenological). So far so good, except that we have sneaked a manifestation into the theory. Narp (Neurotic Accretion Regional Processor) is of course part of the pneuminosity manifestation and does not belong to the meta-philosophy per-se.

Pneuminosity calling it a Narp is already a decision beyond the scope of manifestationism. The decision as to what the human/subject/Narp/dasein *is* is itself a manifestation. Without this site (subject/Narp) there would be no competing manifestations. If though we can accept (apart from extreme scepticism) the temporal progression of the site, we can sort of accept the notion of accretion. This does not mean we have leaped to accepting magick and pneuma, rather only the notion that words following the schema of 'usage' (assimilation) becoming 'definition' (accretion) is acceptable as part of manifestationism and not outside of it. This heuristic schema says nothing ontological and allows the manifestations to proliferate unhindered. The only claim it makes is that information attaches to other information within this site. If this far is permitted the next move *is* agnostic disjunctive. This move is precisely the pneuminous move. When the phenomena occur to the site that inspire religious/magickal thinking, the site must process them either as actual rupture to the normal solidity (pneuminous interference) or illusion with the underlying solidity continuing behind the site-illusion. In both cases there is a kind of accretion. In the former there is the strong version of pneuminous accretions a free floating entities capable (under certain circumstances) of procuring very strange effects in the 'normal' reality in the latter there is still information accreted, it is just the notion that the accretions are somehow out-there is denied. The information is within the site and conveyed between sites. This information-within-the-site is still the dominant manifestation.

Laruelle and Manifestationism

It seems clear to the CEO that there is some linkage between the work of Francois Laruelle and the more recent notion of manifestationism. Manifestationism however is happy to be called a meta-philosophy with as yet partially inchoate reciprocal links with philosophy (pneuminosity). Certainly one empirical argument for manifestationism is the sheer blatant failure of philosophy to significantly shift ground; rather it develops new dialectical variations

but then maintains the old ones as well. So the territory is exactly that of different manifestations jostling for power. Laruelle does not speak in this way but his non-philosophy does have a certain chime insofar as the determination in the last instance of each philosophy have no more privilege over the last -they are all affectations.

The natural question is whether manifestation is guilty of the Laruellian decision (the structure of factum determining datum (though the factum could not have been derived without the datum)). Clearly there is much more thought to go into this but an initial analysis suggests manifestationism is not decisionally guilty. We remember with interest that Laruelle suggests that any philosophy will contain a meta-philosophy. But here manifestationism is only a meta-philosophy, one that was derived from pneuminosity as self-reflectively aware of itself as a-side of the agnostic disjunction (a)magick-obtains/(b)does not obtain. Pneuminosity's having to be aware that it is only a transcendental possibility forces the opening of manifestationism i.e. the proliferations of agnostic disjunctions between all the philosophies rendering them essentially, just as Laruelle says, as affectations (with agents aligning themselves owing to their affective predelictions).

Pneuminosity does have something like a decisional structure, but its condition of recognition (which turns out to be manifestationism) does not. So far in manifestationism we have made no term for what the manifestations are of. This seems in one sense frustrating but in another more methodolically valid that actually nominating it the one-in-one (which immediately starts accreting). Of course even this absence then becomes accretively reminiscent of the forbidding of saying the name of God. This however is not the point here. The point is to say that in saying there are only the manifestations, we do not reach a place where we can say what they are manifestations emitting from (admittedly Laruelle does not either, yet he still feels the need to name it). There are just manifestations, each one with its own criteria to try to take over the territory through its agents. Maybe a terminology from whence they emit will be needed at some point but for now precisely avoiding the designation of the one (which it does seem allies Laruelle himself to a manifestation) seems a better route.

Notes on Manifestationism, Agnostic Disjunction and Laruelle.

Reflections on the notion of the agnostic disjunction -as displaying options between two or

more manifestations- reveal that it must be not just theoretical discussion point but a feature of Narp existence. What is this flickering between options? Here we almost seem to hit the connection between pneuma and manifestationism. Certainly we can couch the problem in those terms. There is a pneuminous flicker, the whole informational schema is shifted or contemplated either within the Narp awareness or outside of it. But this is too much, we cannot couch the answer to a manifestationist issue using pneuma until we have definitively shown that manifestationism entails pneuma. This possibility seems *a priori* excluded from us on the basis that manifestationism is a meta-philosophy that says all philosophies are manifestations. But this raises the immediate problem hidden so far from any account of manifestationism: what are the manifestations manifestations of? This is clearly where Laruelle comes into play, for insofar as there is agreement, the manifestations are determinations in the last instance from the one. This utterly resistant one gives only its manifestations. Laruelle sometimes seems to suggest this exists at a level of preconceptual perception (very happy to be corrected). But for manifestationism that would be just one more manifestation. The essential question would be the cogency of oneness as absolutely immanent and axiomatic. If this is sound then a unified presupposition would be in some sense justified, however if something like a Deleuzian universe as different in itself, of Badiou's axiomatic multiplicity can be conceived as equally possible then oneness itself just becomes another manifestation and the Laruelle-Narp would lapse back into (albeit very interesting) philosophy. A philosophy we might speculate (using our own terminology) shows him as an agent of oneness, as a power working against the tide of multiplicity to reestablish the dominance of oneness.

As it does not seem clear to us that oneness can be perfectly established, at the moment it looks like the non-philosophy is one more manifestation. This is not to belittle it, for its sideways parasitism upon philosophy is fascinating and we have cause to reflect on how it would approach pneuminosity.

So if oneness is not immanent then we do lapse back into pneuminosity insofar as now this itself becomes a meta-term. What manifests? Information. The informational structure is utterly immanent and the only possibility of escaping this is non-information (something postulated elsewhere). This is where the unpicking needs to take place and maybe a re-conceptualisation.

Pneuma has hitherto been discussed in two forms which broadly correlate to the agnostic disjunction magick obtains/magick does not obtain. 'Magick obtains' is the sense in which the term is commonly used here whilst 'magick does not obtain' is known sometimes as weak

pneuma. This latter usage has very little difference from the normal understanding that information to the observer has no effect on the observed thing. The reason the term is used in both instances is because the language of autonomous accretions can be applied in either. The nature of how pneuma accretes is taken as given, this is clearly a gaping hole the theory and a more rigorous desciption of this process is must be supplied. Can it be denied though that information sticks together in Narp awareness? That is a different question and one which seems must be answered in the negative. Maybe just to be on the safe side we should just say information is immanent to itself. This presupposes discreta but does not rule out non-information as an underlying structure.

To return to the earlier problem, it seems then that manifestationism entails information (it does not entail non-information, non-information is a contingency within manifestationism) but it neither entails weak or strong pneuma, it entails only that there is information immanent to itself. It must make this axiomatic since it was achieved by a theorizer. If there was never any theorizer then there would be no manifestationism. For any experience in which the agnostic disjunction manifests there is a pull out of the accretive agency's previously worked for. The agnostic disjunction makes Narp flickers on a pivot in information (where information is the pre-pneuma), it is the accretions that the Narp is an agent for that decide what choices attempt to be made. Of course an agent for contradictory accretions can only lead to one thing:
[P]Neurosis.

Art and Regional-Manifestationism.

Manifestationism is not just a meta-philosophy, it is also a meta-theory for any phenomena. Arguably at the level of accretions, manifestationism works to postulate the identity of anything we isolate with a name. That is, when words become definitionally functional they serve as a theory for a phenomena which we presuppose in common use. I suppose this liquid is water, but it might be vodka. Clear cut cases pose little problem, the dominant accretion wins quite easily. It might be harder in some instances e.g. to tell whether something is plastic or stone and of course both plastic and stone can be broken down into many sub-items. The criteria might support stone or plastic in different measure until some definite characteristic is

unearthed and we say 'it turns out it was plastic'. There are no criteria to invoke extreme scepticism so we are usually happy with such an epistemic outcome. Simple examples like this show the competing nature of conceptual entities for the territory.

However as mentioned, in philosophy there are no discoveries that decide something with this kind of satisfaction. There are new dialectical developments, but often the old dialectical components continue to hang around to continue further competition with their supposedly more advanced counterparts. Manifestationism shows an competing system of different philosophies with no possibility of a winner. This is unlike science where clear criteria for the successful destruction of a concept can sometimes be achieved -or at least an extreme loss of its agents, possibly to none (though no falsification is total).

One interesting case is that of art and the notion of authorship. The endless debate as to whether or not the authors meaning should be privileged is highly characteristic of an agnostic disjunction. There is only the agents of the different positions contesting what constitutes the meaning of the work with no way to determine if either one is 'correct'. This is a fascinating instance in which a regional ontology (of art) finds itself constituted by conceptual war. The amazing term 'real meaning' is literally fought over. What fights over it? We immediately uncover another agnostic disjunction: either individual autonomous selves fight over it or vast conceptual entities controlling the Narps. An almost paradoxical position emerges: if autonomous individual selves exist then some of them are arguing for themselves not to be privileged in the meaning of art, yet if the control is held by pneuminous entities then [some of] the pneuminous (concept) creatures themselves are arguing for individual selves being the source of meaning [of art].

What are we to make of this? There seems to be an asymmetry that might work in favour of pneuminosity here. For if we try to flatten the situation in either direction it only works in one. That is, to at least gain a glimpse of the possibility of resolution let us try to see what the situation would be like if we admitted each one the victor.

So if we hypothesise that individual autonomous selves (incoherent I know, but let's bear with it as kind of heuristic), with each one being in control of the conceptual apparatus at its disposal, are the beings that argue over the territory, what does this entail? The first problem is to ask: what is this conceptual apparatus that they control and what are they that they are something separate from the conceptual apparatus? In this model the concept is not autonomous, it is

something under the control of a separate self. But it doesn't seem clear what the self is apart from the concepts, it seems it must postulated as a kind of transcendental ego. Something must be postulated to autonomously control the concepts.

If however we hypothesize the pneuminous accretions control the Narps then when we ask what is the self? The answer is simple, it is just another pneuminous accretion (the self reflective or neurotic accretion). The site that we call the self is just a site of competing accretions (again a regional manifestationism). Option 2 (pneuminosity) does not need a transcendental ego. In this version we are able to flatten the ontology to pneuminous accretions (concept creatures) all the way down.

This doesn't settle the matter, but by Ockham's razor it gives it one more criterion in its armour. If we did tentatively accept the accretions theory does this effect the war of art-authorship? If we play with strong pneuminosity (actual magickal connectivity) we do not get an answer but we maybe find some illumination. We might not be able to say the authors meaning is the real meaning, but we could say that the orginal Narp's pneuminous threads will be forever attached to the accretion of that particular work of art, they necessarily form part of its genesis. If there are pneuminous fibres of intention there, these too will still be present. In this way the theory of mass conceptual creation ironically has *some* support for direct authorial connection that maybe should be respected. That being said, of course even if that side of the disjunction were true, it is an agnostic disjunction precisely because no one can tell. This means that people *do* project their own meanings on to works. At a pneuminous level there may even be some resistance from the art-accretion itself, however a vast proliferating system of interpretive fibres from Narps will inevitably attach themselves to the work becoming part of its accretion.

In pneuminosity the author *is* there, always present in the work and if they had a specific meaning intended for the work, this too endures (though obscured), yet the accreted crust of artistic hermeneusis cannot be said to not be part of the stucture of what is now the incoherent whole.

What phenomenon could illustrate the pneuminous accretion better?

Exploring Manifestationism and its relation to Pneuma

Manifestationism is shown by agnostic disjunction. The clear case of which is the pneuminous interference case (the inability to know the nature of the paranormal event). This immediately can be seen to have implications for our interpretation of all manner of phenomena. Agnostic disjunction is an immanent process that discloses manifestationism as the nature of our background pneuminous hermeneutic. We live in a flicker of solidity and fluidity. What is presented to us as what is the case is only the case on the back of prior understanding. What is reported as true by particular Narps or large accretive entities (media) has easy criteria for its doubt/acceptance -people/organizations lie for their own ends. These criteria are variously accepted or rejected by the individual Narp.

Recent neo/speculative materialist trends do nothing to help the matter. They busy themselves with overturning a perceived problem with the restrictions of correlationist thought. All this achieves is highlighting the manifestation of realism as opposed to the very humble Kantian approach. It's easy to see why. The staggering progress of science makes the Kantian limitation look ridiculous to some extent. The problem is no matter how ridiculous it might seem the Kantian stranglehold will not give way. It is always possible to perceive any anti-correlationist argument with skepticism. No matter how preposterous it might seem, the thing that we are *could* be ordering the structure of things in a seriously extreme manner. Equally of course the neo-materialism could be correct.

This dual possibility of correctness is again an agnostic disjunction and as mentioned, agnostic disjunction discloses manifestationism. Manifestationism is not another correlationism other than in a kind of epistemological sense. Manifestationism as tied to agnostic disjunction does say that you cannot know which philosophy is correct. This is somewhat in line with Laruelle's notion of philosophical decision as endlessly self perpetuating. A possibility here though is that a philosophy is not a contingent activity, it is a necessary one of any being possessed of a certain degree of self-reflexivity. Such a being will always generate some kind of ontology even if it is not spelled out as an ontology. What is also true of what manifestationism says is that there may in fact be correct interpretations, these are not an impossibility. What is impossible is for us to be certain about them.

The question then is how to escape the circularity of asking what the site of the manifestations is. Any answer seems tied to being another manifestation. The answer seems though that it must be the same. The self-comprehension of the site is itself a flickering series of manifestations: a soul, a psychological self, a nothingness, a site of competing conceptual beings (tick). This must also be the case because any self-comprehension description must also be agnostic-disjunctive ontologically riddled supposition.

The next question is what determines which manifestations are dominant? The aforementioned power of science on various fronts serves to drive criteria that weaken the Kantian grip (but does not break it). This is a more interesting question insofar as the answer is less obvious. Obviously it would once more invoke the circularity if there were an actual answer. The answer is once again that the determining factors of the dominating manifestations is agnostic-disjunctive multiple.

Here though it is worth noting that it is outside of manifestationism to say that all of the manifestations are information (pneuma) where information is a minimal relation between two putative discreta. Any decision on the nature of information is manifestation but there is the possibility of the bracketed acceptance a priori that it all must be information within the site of manifestations (bracketing off flat ontologies that obviate any such relations) -the tentative Narp.

This means the question as to what manifestation is dominant is entirely convertible into what information is dominant in a given site. This means everything in the manifestation site is information in the form of concepts: these are accretions of information (still no transgression of manifestationism has taken place).

Agnostic Disjunction (Magick obtains/Magick does not obtain) as Meta-Manifestation.

"As for P, well P was a different matter. P was in a position to acknowledge -better than myself probably- the strangeness of the event, yet he seemed oblivious to the potential moral content. Q's disappearnce was for him, a source of fascination, yet so great was this fascination that it eclipsed all other sense in his head, even senses pertinent to his own occult inquiry, thus again, in this sense also Q. was utterly gone."

The notion increasingly presses that the titular agnostic disjunction may be the disjunction that colours all manifestations (ontological decisions). This clearly needs seriously thinking through

but it seems a promising corridor. The claim possibly sounds extreme because of the usage of the term magick. In fairness this could be extreme as pneuminous manifestations go all the way up to the strangest cryptid encounter (and down to the simple synchronicity).

The disjunction is disclosed on the interpretation of the encounter. Does it actually seem to entail an alteration in the structure of the seemingly solid externality or doesn't it? This externality is either inert to the conceptual overlay (pneuma) or it isn't. In the occult event the externality seems breached by the pneuma, but the interpretation may draw it back into something commensurate with the solid externality -illusion, hallucination, confirmation bias.

In the Narp the different assimilation-accretions compete to take control of this space. This is difficult to move freely beyond because the nature of the Narp is also agnostic disjunctive: Is there an actual whole self or are there just the competing assimilation-accretions? What even would this difference look like?

In fact the latter entails the former insofar as the name of the Narp forms the centre around which the pneuminous structure accretes. This name-accretion is what we usually call the self, as such it is just one more assimilation-accretion in the Narp, except that in what we call psychological health, it is the dominant one (the neurotic accretion from the term NARP). The first arm of the disjunction on the Narp nature does not mean this. It rather suggests a real self somehow independent of the name. There are no doubt various shades of these but the basic real self or contingent self disjunction is primordial to the problem.

Now neither arm of contingent self/real self does not ally itself necessarily with either arm of magick obtains/does not obtain, rather it discloses these options:

i) Real self-Magick obtains

ii) Real self-Magick does not obtain

iii) Contingent self-Magick obtains

iv) Contingent self-Magick does not obtain

i) The sense of (i) is difficult as of magick entails that information affects what it overlays, we

cannot have a self that resists pneuminous interaction (claims itself to be apart from it). It is true that one could define magick such that it only affected reality outside of the self and one might also define the self as the higher self (the ensouled ontologies also feature here). In this sense it is possible to rescue (i). It is however minimally the most untenable of the manifestations.

ii) Is a situation a lot of people identify with. The self is real but our concepts do not affect the externality. It is difficult to make sense of this insofar as a rigid self is always difficult to justify -it is hard to see how any kind of self is inert to our interactions with it (without defining it out of harms way). However it has a coherence for people's beliefs insofar as the solid external reality is reflected by a similar inward picture.

iii) This is the chaos magickal world commensurate with the philosophy described herein generally. The self is an assimilation-accretion and the possibility of the various assimilation-accretions linking up to make the externality change are actual.

iv) Describes a very rational understanding of the world. Pneuma cannot restructure reality but the self is recognised as contingent. As such assimilation-accretions happen but only at psychological level.

It will be noted in this that there are more manifestations lurking that have not yet been uncovered. The situation is constantly being referred to as one of a Narp conceptually comprehending an externality. This is of course what it looks like yet this situation itself is fraught by manifestationist decision. There may be no actual externality. The whole thing might be nothing but Berklean idea without even a God to prop it up. Of course this kind of idealism is difficult -a pure pneuma with no umbra- because nothing then is given to determine why the world looks like one thing and not another and why it hangs together so well. It is however perfectly functional with magick, which now is not a conceptual overlay overpowering an umbratic but just restructuring of the information. This does also leaves the problem of within the pure idealism there are solid ideas and unsolid ones yet one can however posit this kind of idealism without actually having to explain its mechanics. It *is* a manifestation and one requires no externality that exists at all without the Narp. This pure idealism must also have its non-magickal opposite. This would be a situation of pure ideality which nevertheless is completely solid. In this manifestation, if it were possible to peek round the curtain one would see there was literally nothing outside of the Narp-field (presumably

other aware beings too) yet within it it held together in an absolute consistency in which the idea world was not swayed by the ideas in each Narp. It is always interesting to note that such a pure idealism cannot extirpate the phantasy of the umbratic. Of course the idealism looks extremely untenable anyway but even from within one would still come up with the notion of what is there outside the Narp-field. The idealism must be raised as a manifestation though its agents are few and far between. It just needs noting as the means by which the externality may be rendered incoherent.

This incoherent idealism supplies the reinforcing clue to our starting point. The notion is that each ontology is not a singular ontology, but rather each is a manifestation but must also be bifurcated into its magick obtains/magick does not obtain disjunctive forms. This raises the possibility of other non-pneuminous magickal conceptions. For example transcendental realist/magick-obtains might invoke a completely different condition of possibility [for magick], a picture that might look more like a Harmanian occasionalism.

Manifestationism: Notes on the Tripartite Heuristic

This is just a series of notes trying to put down some reflections on the matter in an attempt to try to make the theory more functional in its explanatory value.

1) Manifestationism attempts to describe a situation of quasi-epistemological relativism in which ontologies compete for territory against each other.

2) We are the space in which this occurs. This invokes the issue that the 'we' itself must equally be recognised as equally a site for ontological competition e.g. are we ensouled, NAARPs, purely material etc.?

3) A recent proposal was made that a basic tripartite structure of:

i) Social descriptions

ii) Scientific descriptions

iii) Metaphysical descriptions

This might give a basic doorway into how the manifestations function. It does broaden the

notion of a manifestation, but this is not a problem as the theory most certainly is supposed to be epistemologically relevant at any level.

4) "Was it you that gave her the book?" someone asks. I reply that it wasn't me but they doubt this is the case, they believe that it was me that gave her the book and that it was not Jessica (who to my mind *did* give her the book). This other subject has reasons for believing the account of the event that they hold to. These are not full-blown ontologies as we would think of them, just regional contingent issues. Nevertheless, they are interesting insofar as they show regular reality level epistemic problems. If Steve has gone home and won't admit to having given her the book and the other subject thinks I did it, they might very well not know it with much certainty but it might be the theory they are invested in. In the manifestationist sense, this subject-region (NAARP) is occupied by certain conceptual powers that determine this theory. These might be something like 'a distrust of myself' 'a belief that I have done something similar before' etc. They are part of a regional theory of me, an ontology of what I *am* in this social sense (an entity not to be trusted). This regional ontology is still a mini manifestation that competes in the territory with others. As a side note this does seem to hint at the potential at least ethical correctness of Korzybski insofar as the static sense of being (an ontology) is guiding a general impression rather than being only a singular instance (I *am* untrustworthy as opposed to I may have exhibited untrustworthy behaviour).

5) If I go on a diet, a particular diet that I've read about for a certain health benefit various things are going on here that may serve to illustrate the matter. I believe the diet is correct and I read about the nutritional science behind it. There are conflicting accounts in the science. But my friend has told me this diet is great and I trust them so I may generally try to not allow the competing account much traction, believing instead the possibly dubious references about the efficacy of the diet. The diet is also part of a quasi new-age belief that hold that certain 'negative energies' will be removed from me by my assiduous following of it. My alliance with my friend has allowed me to take the diet idea in, maybe I've complained about something and they've suggested it. They've then given me evidence of an anecdotal nature that's taken hold. I've tried to rationally reinforce it but encounter an agnostic disjunction insofar as I cannot capably disentangle the conflicting science accounts. I might be open to the notion of energetic cleansing but the discourse is entirely metaphysical. My friend insists upon the reality of it. I might seriously doubt this. But then following the diet feel a curious emotional levity. Do I ascribe this to maybe an increase in omega 3s or to a metaphysical alleviation of 'negative energy'? The synchronicity like problem emerges. I might want to reduce the sensation

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rationally but I cannot be sure that the metaphysically described energy release has not taken place -as I have no criteria to test this by. But I may be convinced of this by the strange levity which I believe cannot be purely nutritionally based. This may also be true from another perspective insofar that the very idea of the energy cleansing may have had some kind of placebo like neural-hormonal feedback (this is clearly related to a weak-pneuminous theory/hyperstitional interpretation).

6) The diet and its interaction with me is a complex dynamic interplay of competing manifestations which in this case cross the full range. A social anecdotal power in relation to whatever issue I may have (which in itself may be a health-related issue given to me from the modern variety of health paranoias). I seek to reinforce this power with acceptable knowledge (science) but am potentially hampered by my alliance to my friend and the appearance equivalence in evidence (competing ontologies). The metaphysical claims of the system are partially validated and thus interpreted positively, I am unable to disprove them even with competing accounts. Because they already exist as ontological possibility (phantasy) they are not removed from the system by simply demonstrating an alternative *even when the alternative is more rational* (where rational means those manifestations we are able to test).

7) Does this point to an inadequacy of language. To the inadequacy of ontology? It does suggest ontology has a home. To predicate one thing of another as a cogent relation may not always be the best way of expressing it -cf the Korzybski point above. But ontology returns even if we want a process ontology.

8) The suggestion is that any given phenomena may be analysed by means of the competing ontologies that make it up. Ergo a total description does not rely upon an ontology to ground it because a total description must take into account that the ontologies in their plurality cannot be overcome. The emergence of individual points insofar as there is more than one (contra the solipsistic manifestation) dialectically creates sceptical situations on multiple levels that necessarily prohibit the dominance of any central ontology even though one (science generated) ontology may actually be correct. The question is then how far a given ontology *could* dominate the territory and create minimal dissonance within the system. The multiple feedbacks seem to make this difficult. A purely present at hand ontology that was true and satisfactory might still generate phenomenological contradictions that create disbelief in the ontology. This potentially ironically could only be resolved if the reality was something

like the strong pneuminous model. That is, if it were *true* that reality were solid and fixed the synchronicity problem *would most likely* still remain. I cannot envisage how it could be extirpated but we could accept the possibility. However if it were *true* that the pneuma fedback ontologically into the umbra then this (as a scientific ontology) would be a more readily acceptable. Why? Because with evidence of a genuine relation of conceptuality and physical experience at a level of physics we could better process that this was a continuous experience of conceptual feedback as opposed to the notion that conceptual feedback is an anomaly (synchronicity/informational interference).

Primordial Agnostic Disjunction

All systems need a patch. It's inescapable. The previously exposed flaw in manifestationism can only be displaced by meta-meta level (since manifestationism itself is a kind of meta-philosophy). The problem with manifestationism is that it must presuppose the incoherence of concepts in order to stay afloat. It is the incoherence of concepts that means they will always have aporias which enemy agents may successfully twist to their own advantage. The incoherence of concepts guarantees the perpetual argument of philosophy especially, but also to all disciplines/knowledge claims (though the incoherence may be more buried). Manifestationism contains the extensive set of ontologies -extensive because it excludes many utterly arbitrary choices that have no mythological or otherwise grounding to them. However one reasonable theory of how things might be, entails that the concepts are not incoherent hence manifestationism contains within itself an ontology that denies the ground on which the meta-theory itself is formed. This is clearly untenable.

To solve (patch) this situation, we propose an agnostic disjunction that occurs before manifestationism occurs. This AD would be the choice between the coherence or the incoherence of concepts. It is admittedly a somewhat bizarre one as it does put forward the possibility that concepts could be coherent which is a notion that does not even seem to clear in itself. Nevertheless it can seem to us that the possibility exists that clear definitions *could* be made for all notions and hence the manifestation is allowed to pass. If it could be shown *a priori* that this was not a possibility then manifestationism could get off the ground on this merit

alone. For the moment though this possibility seems unavailable, furthermore it seems better to include the possibility of coherence as a manifestation than to attempt to prove it can be exclude. Doing this avoids the problem of attempting to exclude a system on conceptual grounds of argumentation whilst simultaneously proposing that conceptual argumentation can never close down any extensive possibility.

In a sense this still keeps the manifestationist picture intact as there is still nothing but competing ontologies. What it does do that's different is create a two tier system in which the first agnostic disjunction must be answered. A complicating question regards the possibility of incoherence and coherence is that of magick. The desired end would be that magick would not be compatible with the notion of coherence. This however is not the case. The magickal possibility is perfectly compatible with the phantasy of coherence it's just that this is not the chaos magickal model. The version of magick that is compatible with coherence is the older version of fixed correspondences as set into existence by some higher power. This hidden but real order of existence is part of the coherence that might uncovered. This more hardline version of magick can also be found within incoherent manifestationism but in coherent coherence it is the only form possible. There is then admittedly a bizarre coherent phantasy embedded in manifestationism.

In other places we have stated that in order to describe pneuminosity as a philosophy we must assume the reality of (chaos) magick. The situation is now that we must first of all assume the incoherent arm of the primordial agnostic disjunction and *then* the reality of chaos magick.