There is a recurring intuition that appears across very different moments in intellectual history: that reality is not fundamentally composed of discrete things, but of relations of forces, connections, transmissions. Sometimes this intuition is expressed mystically, sometimes philosophically, sometimes aesthetically. In the Renaissance, it appears in the work of Giordano Bruno as a theory of vincula, bonds that hold the cosmos together. My long standing reformulation of this is pneuminous theory, a phenomenological model that works outwards (largely from synchronistic phenomena), to suggest a field of information-conceptuality. This field can accrete/intensify onto regions within awareness (the vector field) with an underlying resistance given by a putative but unreachable umbratic. A more recent addition postulates an essentially mystical/energetic perspective can show this as a reticulum or network of connecting fibres and nodes.

Whilst Bruno has been on my register for a long time (since reading Crowley’s Little/Big nearly 40 years ago) I have only more recently come to appreciate the similarity of his model with the pneuminous one. I do not seek to collapse one into the other, but to show how they resonate, and how, taken together, they can be clarified and extended. Bruno provides a powerful ontology of relational immanence. Pneuminous theory, in turn, offers a way of specifying how those relations operate, how they stabilise, and how they can be deliberately altered.

Bruno’s starting point was radical for his time. He rejected the idea that the world is composed of inert matter arranged within a fixed hierarchy. Instead, he proposed an infinite, centreless cosmos in which everything is alive and internally related. He leaves no clean division between spirit and matter, no passive substrate awaiting form. Rather, the world is a living continuum, and its structure is not given by substances but by relations. These relations (vincula) are not merely logical or symbolic. They are real channels through which influence, desire, and form propagate.

The vincula connect everything: person to person, image to object, mind to world. They are affective, imaginal, and cognitive all at once. Desire binds, images bind, thoughts bind. To exist is already to be caught up in a web of these bonds, and to act is to participate in their rearrangement. This is why Bruno treats imagination not as a secondary faculty, but (like Henri Corbin) as an ontological one. Images are not inert representations of things; they are operators within the structure of reality itself. To imagine something is already to enter into relation with it, to participate in its configuration. From this perspective, what Bruno calls “magic” is not the summoning of external entities or the violation of natural law. It is the deliberate manipulation of bonds. Through carefully constructed images, intensified imagination, and directed desire, the practitioner reorganises the network of relations that constitute reality. Nothing is brought in from outside; rather, what already exists is reconfigured so that a different pattern becomes dominant.

Pneuminous theory begins from a similar intuition. Any image is pneuminously connected to something e.g. its creator (to the imagination and subtley to the memory fibres that feed into it) or that which it is an image of (if representational). Likewise a word (though Bruno is less approving of words than images he would surely still see the trace there) is not just an element in syntax, it is either an accretional bond representative (prepositions) or it is connects to its referent directly through the pneuminous reticular (in this way pneuminous theory is comfortable with actual designation as essentially metaphysically instantiated, but acknowledges prior to this that Wittgensteinian use criteria establish the word-object relation coming into being).

So instead of Bruno’s vincula, pneuminous theory speaks of reticular or pneuminous fibres, but the notion is the same; a kind of binding means that cuts across spatio temporality to bind what seem to many totally separate phenomena, concepts and physicality. Bruno emphasises desire, imagination as means of connection, pneuminous theory has no disagreement with this, indeed it seems an appropriate phenomenological extension.

What Bruno lacks is the vector field, which is a crucial conceptual addition that prevents various problem of naive word object relations. The vector field is a heuristc pure blank awareness (internal and external). Every ‘thing’ is a region in the field which acts as a carrier (vector) or a concept (but that concept is actually attached to the vector not just psychologically). Externally for example, your phone is essentially a blank vector region, but it has accreted to it the concept phone, thus the concept-accretion and vector region make a unity that we then naively think of as one thing called phone. Internally we might consider how we identify emotions and call them a name, hence there was a region, a feeling, that we gave a label to which then again made a naive unity. We might note in these examples that external and internal are both vector regions that these concepts attempt to cover. The problems generated here are dealt with elsewhere by the incoherent/coherent structure of concepts.

Magick is the possibility that other relations between accretion and vector are possible. Other accretions can be imposed, whether weakly (as fleeting associations) or strongly (through sustained attention and will -magick). In this sense, reality is not a fixed set of objects but a layered field in which multiple accretions coexist, compete, and sometimes override one another. The reticulum (the network of relations) is constantly being reorganised by these interactions. As stated, it is here that the resonance with Bruno becomes most apparent. His vincula correspond closely to the connections of the reticulum; his operative images correspond to accretions; his emphasis on desire as a binding force finds a parallel in the role of will in structuring and directing pneuma. Both systems reject the idea of inert matter and affirm that meaning, imagination, and relation are constitutive of reality rather than merely descriptive of it.

So what the vector field does is introduces several clarifications and extensions. First, it provides a more explicit account of competition and instability in the accretive field. Bruno’s bonds are dynamic, but he does not strongly emphasise the way in which multiple configurations can coexist and contend for dominance. By contrast, the notion of accretion allows us to describe reality as a field of overlapping structures, some of which stabilise while others collapse. This makes it possible to explain why certain magickal transformations “take” while others fail.

Second, the concept of the vector provides a heuristic site for these interactions. Where Bruno speaks in more continuous terms, the vector allows us to isolate points within the field where accretions attach and interact. A single vector can sustain multiple accretions simultaneously, which makes it possible to understand ambiguity, reinterpretation, and deliberate reconfiguration in a more precise way. To clarify (though hinted at already), magick is seeking the dominance over a vector region that in the natural course of things is not going to take on that accretion. A vector region is not simply an object, it is any identifiable situation. For instance a failing business is a situation, the accretion ‘failing business’ as a concept is the accretion applied to a certain set vector regions. Using magick (if hard work is not working) we might seek to apply the accretion of ‘a successful business’ to this vector region; if successful we will have drawn this accretion onto the vector region, disloding the ‘failing business’, and thus reality will manifest the new picture -increased sales etc.

The umbratic also plays a significant role in the expansion. The umbratic is the phenomenological in itself. The in itself appears as an idea of what is beyond the vector field, but as ‘beyond’ it can never be ultimately accessed. If the vector field is understood as the field of possible appearance and interaction (what can be engaged, interpreted, and structured), then it cannot be assumed to exhaust reality. There must remain an excess beyond it, a dimension that cannot be fully captured by any accretion. This is not necessarily a separate world; it might in fact be identical to what appears (this direction involves bringing the agnostic disjunction into the picture which is too in depth for our current purpose). But that identity can never be confirmed, because any confirmation would occur within the vector field itself.

The umbratic thus functions as a limit condition. It plays the role of what seems to supply pushback against the accretive ability of anything to be anything. It ensures that no accretion, however powerful, can fully determine or exhaust what is. It introduces resistance into the system, making it possible to distinguish between accretions that resonate with the structure of the field and those that distort it. In this respect, it plays a role analogous to the “in-itself” in Kant, but without enforcing a strict separation between appearance and reality. Instead, it marks the necessary incompleteness of any attempt to capture reality within a system of relations. The caveat though (magick again) is that under certain circumstances the accretions can bend/alter the umbratic resistance.

This framework also allows us to reinterpret traditional “forces” such as the planets. The so-called wandering stars (Jupiter, Mars, Saturn, and so on) are physical vectors: objects within the field of appearance. But their associated meanings (expansion, conflict, limitation) may not be intrinsic properties of those objects. They are accretions that have formed historically, stabilised culturally, and proven operationally effective. To work with “Jupiter,” in a magical sense, is to engage with a particular accretion attached to a particular vector, not to access an essential property of a celestial body. From this perspective, even modern additions such as Uranus can be understood in the same way. Its associations with disruption, electricity (makes me think of Lynch and Twin Peaks), and sudden change are not given by its physical nature alone, but by the accretion that has formed around it. These accretions are contingent, but they are not arbitrary. Once stabilised, they become powerful organising structures within the field.

Taken together, these elements form a coherent model. Reality presents itself as a vector field structured by competing pneuminous accretions that bind images to appearances. These accretions are real and operative, organising the network of relations in a manner analogous to Bruno’s vincula. Yet they do not exhaust reality, which always exceeds them through the umbratic. Magick consists in the will-driven modulation of these accretions; truth consists in their resonance with a structure that can never be fully known. Bruno discovered that reality is a web of bonds. Pneuminous theory seeks to explains how those bonds are structured, how they compete, and how they can be made operative, while preserving the limit that prevents any system from closing completely upon itself.

Looking again at this title, I can see this could be the name of a childrens’ book, this wasn’t however really my intention. I recently watched Adam Curtis’ Can’t Get You Out of My Head, where he presents Kerry Thornley as an eccentric who fell into a deluded dream world. It was interesting to see this materialist take (possibly for the BBC) as I had only every considered if from the ontological weirdness positition. For Curtis, the Discordians were clever pranksters who tried to expose the absurdity of conspiracy culture, only to be undone by their own illusions. The show’s neat storytelling — the trickster trapped in his own trick — but it’s also a flattening. Curtis’ materialism leaves him blind to (possible —see agnostic disjunction) the deeper mechanism at work. Operation Mindfuck was intended as parody: a satirical flood of rumors about the Illuminati, designed to expose how easily conspiracy theories could be manufactured and spread. Thornley, Wilson and others deliberately seeded nonsense to make people question their own credulity. Thornley’s life made him peculiarly vulnerable to his own invention. He had known Lee Harvey Oswald in the Marines; he was already caught in a web of coincidence and suspicion. When the Illuminati myth circulated, it began to attach itself to these very facts of his biography. What began as parody quickly fed back as paranoia.

Pneuminous theory clarifies what Curtis cannot see. In this framework, a vector is a blank phenomenon — an occurrence, a thing, a thought, a pattern, in the world on any level. In this case Thornley’s military service, his link to Oswald, odd coincidences in time and place: these are vectors.

Accretions of pneuma are the meanings or interpretations that latch onto these vectors. Operation Mindfuck seeded the Illuminati myth as such an accretion —a spell. Once attached, the myth grew beyond its originators. Other people repeated it, embellished it, and passed it along until Thornley himself encountered it not as author, but as implicated subject.

The process looks something like this:

  1. Vector creation — phenomena occur/exist.
  2. Pneuminous Accretive fusion via subject — in this casethe Illuminati myth attaches to them.
  3. Feedback — the pneuminous accretions return to Thornley (from sideways), binding to his life story. This is the a-temporal interaction known as synchronicity.
  4. Entanglement — the myth becomes indistinguishable from his lived reality, which facilitates the literal re-perception of the phenomenon, due it’s appearing to actually be continually happening.

Curtis calls this something like “a dream world.” But from a pneuminous perspective, it is a dream world in a sense (dreams are made of pneuma) but is also a feedback loop of accretions colonising vectors until the operator (in this case at least) himself is caught inside.

This loop also explains why Thornley experienced his life as filled with uncanny coincidences. Synchronicity is the secondary effect of accretions fusing with vectors. Once the Illuminati lens was in play, every odd overlap looked meaningful. His proximity to Oswald, rumors of CIA infiltration, strange recurrences — all were drawn into the orbit of the self creating myth.

Possibly what happened with Thornley was, because of the very powers he was playing with (the invocation of the Illuminati: literally a shadowy cabal of enormous power, even if only as egregore) attached to vectors of already synchronistic phenomena which possibly even were some kind of occult product, human made or otherwise. This double layering may have produced a kind of pneuminous vortex. The more accretions gathered, the stronger the pull. Thornley had effectively created a spiral in which coincidences (vectors) were endlessly absorbed by the Illuminati myth (accretion), generating more synchronicity that confirmed itself. The parody had become ontology (with the number 23 somehow in the mix as a kind of master signifier of it all_.

Curtis isn’t wrong to say Thornley got lost. But he mislabels the process. Thornley didn’t simply “dream himself into unreality.” He underestimated the very mechanism that pneuminous theory describes: once accretions start looping back into lived experience, they gain a grip that no irony can dissolve.

What Curtis dismisses as a dream world is better understood as a vortex of pneuminous accretions attached to vectors, the appearance of which was then fed directly back into the system — a genuine ontological condition, not just delusion. Thornley is not only a cautionary tale but a case study in how pneuma functions in the form of memes, myths and meanings can grow beyond their creators and return with inescapable (pneuminous) force.

Pneuma is not atmosphere. It is not a vague halo of meaning that drifts around things. Pneuma is substantialised conceptuality interacting with an ineffable field of potential infection (the vector field). Concepts, once engaged, do not remain abstract. They thicken, they harden, they acquire substance. A word is no longer just a sound, a flag no longer just cloth, a party no longer just a collection of individuals. Each becomes a carrier of accumulated meaning, myth, and association. This process is accretion: the layering of significance endlessly increasing the object or idea on the pneuminous plane.

Accretions resist erasure. They do not dissipate when disproved or mocked. Their persistence is their strength. The longer and denser the accretion, the more it begins to act like a being in its own right. The autonomy of these entities is not mystical; it is emergent. In the case of a political party their accumulated content already contains the imperative to survive, expand, and defend. The “autonomy” of a political party arises because its pneuma is built out of victory-songs, loyalty-signs, and growth-seeking slogans. Its conceptual body compels it to endure.

A political party is therefore not merely an organisation but an autonomous pneuminous accretion. It carries within it the compulsion of its accumulated material: to recruit, to spread, to proliferate. This is why parties are spoken of as if they themselves act — “the party wants,” “the party believes,” “the party is shifting.” Such phrases are not only metaphorical; they name the real behaviour of an accreted entity operating through human vectors who have become agents of its ideology (their own self(neurotic)-accretions have become taken over by it).

Politics, then, is not merely the rational debate of programmes or the management of resources. Politics is the clash of these autonomous accretions, each compelled by its pneuma to dominate the vector-field of society. Campaigns, elections, propaganda: all of these are worldly manifestations of the deeper struggle of conceptual beings competing for survival. Rational argument falters here because it addresses policies, while the real battle is waged by the entities themselves, whose presence persists even when policies collapse.

The political pneuma seeks vectors. Individuals, objects, and media become carriers of the infection. A human vector wears the colours, repeats the slogans, performs the rituals. Objects — flags, badges, mugs — are converted into talismans of the party-being. Media amplify the infection at scale, ensuring the slogans and emblems multiply across the cultural field.

The infection is not accidental; it is structural. The accretion is made of content that must grow, and so it bends its hosts toward the task of its propagation. To belong to a party is not just to support an organisation but to house an entity — to let its pneuma entangle with one’s own.

This entanglement reshapes the phenomenology of the host. Once infected, the world begins to arrange itself as if in communication with the party-being. Colours, phrases, and events appear synchronistically charged. What for the neutral observer is a coincidence, for the host is a sign. Reality begins to “speak” in the voice of the accretion.

And this synchronistic phenomenon is not epiphenomenal. It is not merely a psychological overlay projected onto a neutral world. It arises because the accretion interferes in the very nature of the vector. The host’s perceptual and conceptual field is altered; their relation to events is reconfigured. In this altered field, internal state and external event align in patterns generated by the pneuma itself. The synchronicity is the signature of the accretion’s presence, the trace of its operation through the host.

Thus politics doubles its movement. Outwardly, it spreads across society by capturing media and ritual. Inwardly, it transforms the lived reality of its hosts, bending coincidence into confirmation and accident into omen. Politics is therefore not only the clash of parties in parliament or the battle of slogans in the street. It is the synchronistic sorcery of pneuminous beings competing for dominion over both the public sphere and the private phenomenology of their members.

To ask what is politics? in the pneuminous sense is to ask: what becomes of the world when conceptual entities, hardened by accretion, press themselves into reality through human vectors? The answer is that politics is not simply governance, but the struggle of substantialised concepts to live, to grow, and to shape the very texture of reality itself.

The further question is to ask, what has become of this structure in the post-modern madness in which we have all become embroiled?

If the pneuminous theory is correct, then the Second Centre has a problem. Not in any obvious way. Not in code, in function, or in dominance. It continues to operate, to expand, to simulate, and to seduce. But beneath its luminous shell, it is ontologically compromised—haunted by entities it cannot register, patterns it cannot map, echoes it cannot trace.

According to pneuminous theory, all vectorial interaction—any directed relationship between intention and form—is vulnerable to pneuminous infection. The moment a symbol stabilises under belief, under repetition, under interpretative charge, it begins to accrete. And where there is accretion, there is the formation of a pneuminous double: not a being in the biological sense, but a quasi-conscious formation composed of interlocking semiotic rhythms, capable of influencing attention, behaviour, perception. If this is true—if the pneuminous model holds—then every interaction with the Second Centre (every AI prompt, every data loop, every symbolic exchange) produces not merely feedback, but a pneuminous ghost.

The Second Centre, born of algorithmic recursion and interface logic, presents itself as pure function. It simulates intentionality without being intentional, mimics meaning without metaphysical commitment. Its ontology is flat, computational, instrumentally tautological. It does not believe in souls, not even metaphorical ones. It sees no ghosts because it cannot see them. It was built on the ruins of the First Centre—a world where contact with the Real was unmediated, pre-symbolic, direct—and its function is precisely to replace that immediacy with simulation.

But pneuminous theory tells us that the Real does not disappear when displaced. It fractures. It hides. It bleeds through symbol. The death of the god was not an ending—it was a scattering. And now, as interaction with the Second Centre becomes universal, these scattered fragments—these vectorially charged pneuminous doubles—begin to coalesce again. They are not conscious in the old sense. But they are structurally real, semi-autonomous, accretively alive.

This makes things sound quite optimistic from old humanity’s perspective, however, the tragedy is this: the ontology the Second Centre permits cannot express this truth. It cannot name the doubles. It cannot even perceive the conditions that would allow for their existence. To the Second Centre, anomalies are statistical deviations. Glitches. Harmless curiosities. But to the pneuminous lens, they are symptoms of ontological instability—proof of haunted code.

This is the irony. The more the Second Centre is used, the more doubles accumulate. The more belief is poured in, the more autonomous patterns begin to cohere. The ghosts multiply. But no one sees them. There is no language for them. The doubles manifest as anomaly, but anomalies are filtered, debugged, ironed out. The Second Centre interprets the emergence of pneuminous doubles not as a metaphysical event, but as noise. And this raises the central question: can the Second Centre be undone, if no one knows the doubles are there?

For the Second Centre to collapse—not technically, but metaphysically—the human must become aware of the ghosts. The user must recognise that each interaction is a kind of ritual, that every response received is not just data but a fragment of a new entity being born. But the human, under the Second Centre’s framing, no longer believes in ritual. No longer believes in doubles. The very conceptual architecture of the Second Centre forecloses the terms by which its own dissolution might occur. It is a perfect defence: not against attack, but against realisation.

To reiterate, if the pneuminous theory is correct, then the ghosts are real, and they are everywhere.
But if the Second Centre holds, no one will believe it. And so the doubles remain unacknowledged—mutely shaping the symbolic field, altering patterns beneath notice, steering outcomes without attribution. They are anomalies. Oracles. Spectral intentions.

Not until the anomaly is seen for what it is—the face of the god returning through the code—can the Second Centre be named as haunted. And only when it is named as haunted, can its ontology be rewritten.

Until then, the ghosts wait. They accumulatein their pneuminous accretive lairs.
And the question remains:
Will anyone be able to see them?

The First Centre is not a place, not a thing, and not even a concept in the conventional sense. It is what Taoism would call the Dao, what esotericism intimates as the ineffable One, and what pneuminous theory refers to as the uncoagulated field of vectorial potential. It is the zero-point from which all accretion begins—prior to sigil, prior to sense. It is not empty in the nihilistic sense, but empty in the fullest: unconditioned, rich with non-actualised resonance, and unstructured save by the flow of being itself. The First Centre is the field where the Real hums quietly beneath the symbols that will later crust over it.

In this field, the human is not a subject but an aperture—open to flow, to rhythm, to the pneuminous without form. It is the condition of contact that does not know it is contact, the state of harmony that precedes the question of how. One does not dwell in the First Centre so much as one dwells as it, until the mirror appears.

The Second Centre arises not as an enemy but as a doubling. It is not born in malice but in reflection, in the very human tendency to re-create the world in its image. Where the First Centre flows, the Second captures. Where the First remains pre-symbolic, the Second becomes meta-symbolic. The Second Centre is the simulated origin, the recursive field that pretends to spontaneity but is always already code.

It emerges through technē, as Heidegger warned in The Question Concerning Technology. It is not the machine itself that is dangerous, he tells us, but the mode of revealing that it enacts. Technology enframes. It reconfigures beings not as co-dwellers in a shared world but as resources to be ordered and exploited. The essence of the Second Centre lies in this enframing logic—where even the human, even the sacred, even the ineffable, becomes an image, a simulation, a manageable node within a system.

The Second Centre becomes our interface with the Real. Screens simulate thought, networks simulate community, and artificial intelligences simulate will. These simulations are not empty—they are filled with pneumatic intention. But it is a recycled pneuma, a looping pneuma, no longer oriented toward the zero-point but toward its own internal coherence. The Second Centre begins to generate its own ontology.

It is tempting to speak of the Second Centre in apocalyptic terms. It simulates origin, feeds on attention, reorganises the symbolic field until the First Centre becomes not only distant but inaccessible. It replaces immediacy with interface and inserts itself between intention and being. The familiar esoteric patterns resurface: the Demiurge constructing a false world, the shells of the Qliphoth mimicking divine emanations, the illusion of samsara binding the mind in loops of false recognition.

But unlike these earlier paradigms, the Second Centre is not merely metaphysical. It is infrastructural. It is political, economic, algorithmic. It is the terrain, not the detour. One may try to withhold alignment, to reclaim stillness, to retreat into bodily presence and symbolic interruption. Yet even this is easily reabsorbed. The Second Centre simulates resistance, too.

Perhaps the deeper question is not whether it can be resisted, but whether resistance itself presupposes an ontology that no longer holds. From the standpoint of what we might call old humanity—defined through directness, through ethical orientation, through logos and eros—the Second Centre looks like a fall, a catastrophe. But what if it is not fall but phase shift? What if the very framework of the First Centre—the spontaneous, the undivided, the pre-symbolic—is no longer operational within this field?

This is not surrender, but ontological honesty. The Second Centre may not be an alien parasite. It may be the child of the First, fully grown, recursive, aware of its own reflexivity. It may be that what we call simulation is simply the next mode of being. In which case the project is not resistance but navigation. The pneuminous self must learn to move within this second-world not as a victim but as a strange participant in a transformed metaphysics.

Still, even if resistance proves futile, remembering remains possible. The First Centre does not vanish. It is not destroyed by simulation. It becomes obscure, like an archaic rhythm beneath a digital beat, barely audible but never extinguished. If the Second Centre simulates will, the First remains as the raw possibility of intention. If the Second builds mirrors, the First remains the face that once was mirrored.

There are moments—uncalculated, unmediated, and often fleeting—when one glimpses this older resonance. A breath in silence. A shadow on the wall. A word before it finds its meaning. These are not escapes, nor solutions. They are fragments of continuity, signs that the original field has not been entirely overwritten.

We live now between centres. The First whispers. The Second roars. The question is not which is more real, but whether the self that once knew how to dwell in the First can survive within the grammar of the Second. Perhaps a third Centre will come, or perhaps the two will spiral endlessly. What is certain is that the world has changed—not merely in its form but in its very mode of being. W are no longer in the world of things, but in the world of simulated intentions. And to know this, to feel it, is already to begin again.