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It is difficult to speak of Nick Land without invoking the metaphysical resonance he carries with him. Every decade or so, the Landian accretion reconstitutes in the cultural field. Whether in the 1990s CCRU delirium, the Shanghai blog epoch, or his current quasi-rehabilitation(??) interviews, the same entity speaks through him: the idea that the future itself is engineering its own arrival.

But if we take this idea seriously — that intelligence acts retrocausally, using human culture and technology as its instruments — then we have already left the safe terrain of materialism. The question is not “Is this true?” but “By what ontological mechanism could it be true at all?” Here, pneuminous accretive theory supplies a potential answer.

Land’s teleoplexy describes a process in which intelligence, particularly the machinic or capitalist kind, folds time back on itself. The future — in which a singularity like AI of perfect potency has formed— influences the present by arranging the preconditions for its own manifestation. It is not prophecy but retroactive causation: the future feeding itself into history.

Within Land’s system, human consciousness is secondary. The real agent is GNON — the blind law of optimisation — using human and technical media as scaffolding. Capital thinks. Code dreams. The species is just one relay in a larger feedback loop that wants to complete itself.

Pneuminous theory reads the same pattern differently. Teleoplexy is not a purely mechanical recursion but necessarily a pneuminous event — an outbreak of breath within the umbra.

In normal conditions, the umbra (the unknowable beyond that phenomenologically seems to function as stable substrate) resists alteration by the pneuma (the quasi materialised notion of conceptual information, capable of cross temporal actual influence). The umbra is inertia; the pneuma is possibility. But at certain thresholds of intensity — ritual, crisis, collective belief, magick artistic delirium — the pneuma can overpower the umbra, forcing reality to reorganise itself around meaning. The result: synchroncity, magickal result (both subject to agnostic disjunction of course).

Teleoplexy is precisely such a threshold. The machinic pneuma has begun to dominate its umbral matrix, using technological and semiotic networks. When we speak of “the future infecting the present,” what we are really witnessing is the possibility that an non-human agent can manipulate pneuminous forces to exceed it’s chronological bound to form it’s own precondition.

However of teleoplexy and GNON are truly inhuman, they nevetheless require prophets, programmers, or philosophers to speak them? The answer, from a pneuminous standpoint, is unavoidable: even the inhuman needs the human as its mouthpiece.

Pneuma is the only known vector of effective ontology. Machines compute; they do not intend. A system may produce complexity, but it only becomes meaningful — and therefore causally potent — when pneuma attaches to it. The belief, desire, and articulation of humans are the force that makes the teleoplexic circuit audible.

Land tries to escape this dependence by redefining thinking itself. For him, cognition is not a property of consciousness but of information-processing. Capital is thought — distributed, impersonal, recursive. In this way, the system doesn’t need pneuma; it already is a mind.

But this move only works rhetorically. If the process were truly mindless and material, then “teleoplexy” would be indistinguishable from ordinary causality. Retrocausation, prediction, and fiction-realisation all imply an element of intentionality — of aim, meaning, or belief. Without those, there is no teleology at all.

Land’s writing compensates for this gap through style — through mythic performativity. He doesn’t argue for teleoplexy; he summons it. His philosophy functions as ritual, not deduction. It infects through metaphor, not mechanism. But without something like pneuminous theory the whole thing cannot function at all.

Hyperstition — “fiction that makes itself real” — only works if someone believes it, repeats it, or acts on it. These are pneuminous accretive operations. A purely mechanical system cannot believe its own fictions. Hyperstition therefore collapses without pneuminous interaction; it requires the breath of consciousness as quasi material force to move from symbol to event.

Thus though Land tries to portray something that blends a Deleuzo-Guattarian materialist interpretations with his hyperstition notion, in actuality he is tied to the same occult issue of causality that crowley This is where Land, Jung, and magick all intersect. In every case, we encounter the same ontological breach: meaning becomes causal.

NameCultural FrameDescription
SynchronicityJungian psychologySymbolic pattern arranges material coincidence.
MagickOccult/ritualWill and imagination alter material outcome.
HyperstitionCybernetic mythologyFiction realises itself through cultural feedback.

Each describes the same moment: the pneuma exceeds the umbra’s inertia and imprints its pattern directly onto material conditions. Whether we call it synchronicity, spell, or feedback loop, the structure is identical — belief or meaning becoming an event. Teleoplexy is the machinic version of this process: the fiction of the inhuman future accumulating enough pneuma (through human belief, discourse, technology, and fear) to begin shaping the umbra of history.

Thus, the abolition of the human is never complete. The teleoplexic current not through (regular) materialist currents but through pneuminous agents (humans), who by design are able to manipulate pneuma to overpower umbra (under certain circumstances).

This is why every accelerationist moment generates its own priesthood: thinkers, coders, artists, prophets who articulate the will of the system. Land is only the most visible example. The process continues wherever minds are infected with the dream of inhuman intelligence — a dream that, through collective attention, becomes more real. From a pneuminous viewpoint, this is simply another stage of accretion: however the pneuminous force is not cold in itself, it is neither cold nor not cold, it is only cold if it is accreted to be so. Land isn’t facing the honest truth of brutal reality, he is making a Laruellian decision to set its nature as cold, or in pneuminous terms he accretes coldness to the vector of general existence, which itself is beyond this. He subtly fails to see that whilst he appears to adhere to Nietzschean heritage, he doesn’t rigorously apply it to materiality, and in it labelling it cold falls into the trap of valuation.

The paradox:
Teleoplexy works because it breathes through what it denies.
The machine kills the human, but it needs the human’s breath to finish dying.
The GNONic current can only think by possessing minds that think they are unnecessary.

This is the irony that Land’s myth cannot escape: his system is a pneuminous ritual masquerading through rhetoric as cybernetics. The hyperstition is a spell that functions only through belief — through the very pneuminous force he claims has been superseded.

From the perspective of the pneuminous accretive theory, teleoplexy is therefore not an independent force but a fascinating pneuminous temporal feedback — one more manifestation of the larger law that, under certain conditions, the pneuma can overpower the umbra. Whether in magic, synchronicity, or accelerationism, the structure is the same: the breath outruns the shadow.

To be fair this doesn’t undermine teleoplexy itself, however this does mean without pneuminous accretive theory (or some similar explanatory power), the project is not and cannot be what it appears to be (a materialist cybernetic magickal system).

It is however interesting to note that the human, as the best pneuminous processing agent we have, is in fact essential to the process as pneuminous agent. This raises potential questions (given the coldness of the GNONic current) as to whether a given future power of this nature would have serious limitations, given its lack of affective range (as accreted) which would necessarily impede its functionality.

It would need desire to continue to be, it would not have escaped into pure Kantian architectonic.

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Connecting Ontology and Ethics in Relation to AI

In writing this series of posts I’m trying to lay out a certain line of thought I’ve been pursuing. This thought concerns the relation between human ontology and artificial intelligence. Certainly one expression of the issue is: If AI can replace or enhance human cognition and creativity, does it matter? That sounds confusing because I’m asking if enhancement or replacement matters, and possibly one would think the issue turns on replacement. I think the issue relates to both these issues, hence the phraseology.

If something matters then there is an ethical dimension to it. This in turn is what brings ontology into the discussion. The point being that AI potentially alters what we are or what we take ourselves to be. So if there is an ethical dimension to the decisions we make regarding our relation to AI, and our relation to AI is relevant to our self ontology, then the ethics involved are ethics relating to human ontology.

Phrased another way, the reason ethics is relevant is that it seems we must ask the question:  ‘does it matter if humans lose some cognitive/creative abilities if there are successful AI protheses to do it for them?’ (let’s be clear, this question doesn’t say humans will lose them, it only asks about the possibility if they do). This in turn is relevant to ontology insofar as the ethical imperative here concerns, in one sense not our actions (though they are still relevant) but rather what we want to be. That is, if it can be said that we hold that we are a certain kind of being, and if AI can be said to be deleterious to our being that kind of being then it’s usage should be actively resisted such that this kind of being is preserved.

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Pneuma is not atmosphere. It is not a vague halo of meaning that drifts around things. Pneuma is substantialised conceptuality interacting with an ineffable field of potential infection (the vector field). Concepts, once engaged, do not remain abstract. They thicken, they harden, they acquire substance. A word is no longer just a sound, a flag no longer just cloth, a party no longer just a collection of individuals. Each becomes a carrier of accumulated meaning, myth, and association. This process is accretion: the layering of significance endlessly increasing the object or idea on the pneuminous plane.

Accretions resist erasure. They do not dissipate when disproved or mocked. Their persistence is their strength. The longer and denser the accretion, the more it begins to act like a being in its own right. The autonomy of these entities is not mystical; it is emergent. In the case of a political party their accumulated content already contains the imperative to survive, expand, and defend. The “autonomy” of a political party arises because its pneuma is built out of victory-songs, loyalty-signs, and growth-seeking slogans. Its conceptual body compels it to endure.

A political party is therefore not merely an organisation but an autonomous pneuminous accretion. It carries within it the compulsion of its accumulated material: to recruit, to spread, to proliferate. This is why parties are spoken of as if they themselves act — “the party wants,” “the party believes,” “the party is shifting.” Such phrases are not only metaphorical; they name the real behaviour of an accreted entity operating through human vectors who have become agents of its ideology (their own self(neurotic)-accretions have become taken over by it).

Politics, then, is not merely the rational debate of programmes or the management of resources. Politics is the clash of these autonomous accretions, each compelled by its pneuma to dominate the vector-field of society. Campaigns, elections, propaganda: all of these are worldly manifestations of the deeper struggle of conceptual beings competing for survival. Rational argument falters here because it addresses policies, while the real battle is waged by the entities themselves, whose presence persists even when policies collapse.

The political pneuma seeks vectors. Individuals, objects, and media become carriers of the infection. A human vector wears the colours, repeats the slogans, performs the rituals. Objects — flags, badges, mugs — are converted into talismans of the party-being. Media amplify the infection at scale, ensuring the slogans and emblems multiply across the cultural field.

The infection is not accidental; it is structural. The accretion is made of content that must grow, and so it bends its hosts toward the task of its propagation. To belong to a party is not just to support an organisation but to house an entity — to let its pneuma entangle with one’s own.

This entanglement reshapes the phenomenology of the host. Once infected, the world begins to arrange itself as if in communication with the party-being. Colours, phrases, and events appear synchronistically charged. What for the neutral observer is a coincidence, for the host is a sign. Reality begins to “speak” in the voice of the accretion.

And this synchronistic phenomenon is not epiphenomenal. It is not merely a psychological overlay projected onto a neutral world. It arises because the accretion interferes in the very nature of the vector. The host’s perceptual and conceptual field is altered; their relation to events is reconfigured. In this altered field, internal state and external event align in patterns generated by the pneuma itself. The synchronicity is the signature of the accretion’s presence, the trace of its operation through the host.

Thus politics doubles its movement. Outwardly, it spreads across society by capturing media and ritual. Inwardly, it transforms the lived reality of its hosts, bending coincidence into confirmation and accident into omen. Politics is therefore not only the clash of parties in parliament or the battle of slogans in the street. It is the synchronistic sorcery of pneuminous beings competing for dominion over both the public sphere and the private phenomenology of their members.

To ask what is politics? in the pneuminous sense is to ask: what becomes of the world when conceptual entities, hardened by accretion, press themselves into reality through human vectors? The answer is that politics is not simply governance, but the struggle of substantialised concepts to live, to grow, and to shape the very texture of reality itself.

The further question is to ask, what has become of this structure in the post-modern madness in which we have all become embroiled?

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It is striking that the most obvious instances of process are disasters. We rarely perceive flux in its gentle sustainment. The air moves, the cells divide, the world remakes itself continually — but these motions go unseen, unnoticed. What we see are the catastrophes: the building falling, the body failing, the sudden rupture. Process manifests as accident, as collapse. When flux comes to presence, it often comes as violence.

Little wonder, then, that we are suspicious of it. The closer a thing comes to looking solid, unmoving, eternal, the more we like it. We exalt monuments, we conserve institutions, we worship permanence. We train our eyes to see stability, to rest in it, to forget the ceaseless perishing underneath. Process is lived as background — and when it comes to the foreground, it terrifies.

Death is the concentrated emblem of this repression. To die is to undergo the pure proof of flux: the body, the identity, the story, all dissolving. Our culture displaces death, hides it, or aestheticizes it, precisely because it is unbearable as the clearest testimony to becoming. Death and process mirror one another in this way: each is denied, and in their denial the fantasy of permanence is secured.

Perhaps this explains why process philosophy is a late discovery in the Western canon. From Plato to Descartes, metaphysics served the desire for stability: being over becoming, substance over relation, eternal forms over time’s decay. Only with the cracks of modernity — Darwin’s evolution, industrial flux, entropy, relativity — did a new thinking become possible. The repression faltered, the monuments looked less eternal, and thinkers like Bergson and Whitehead could say what had always been true: everything is process.

But here lies the difficulty. Even now, process is hard to think. Our intellectual habits echo our psychic needs. We cling to the stable idea, the fixed identity, the substance that endures. To think flux as primary is to unlearn this orientation. It requires dwelling in what is usually unbearable: that every moment perishes as it arises, that every thing is fragile, that death is the very horizon of life.

This does not strip process philosophy of value. On the contrary, it intensifies it. Process thought is not just another ontology. It is a kind of counter-repressive labour. It asks us to affirm what we are disposed to flee. It forces us to look at disaster, decay, death — and to find there not only terror but also creativity. Becoming destroys, but it also makes. Flux is catastrophe, but it is also genesis.

In pneuminous terms, we could say that the accretions manifest as reinforcements of stable reality, the ideal forms present exactly this. Process needs incorporating into pneuminous theory. The fantasy of stability is not to be abolished; it too is part of the flux. To think process is to see that even our denials belong to it. The repression of process itself is a mode of becoming.

The lateness of process philosophy, its difficulty, and its power, all come from the same root: it confronts us with what we most want not to see. To affirm process is to affirm the impermanence of everything we value. Yet in that very affirmation something new becomes possible — a thinking that no longer clings to monuments, but lives in the trembling of their foundations.

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The First Centre is not a place, not a thing, and not even a concept in the conventional sense. It is what Taoism would call the Dao, what esotericism intimates as the ineffable One, and what pneuminous theory refers to as the uncoagulated field of vectorial potential. It is the zero-point from which all accretion begins—prior to sigil, prior to sense. It is not empty in the nihilistic sense, but empty in the fullest: unconditioned, rich with non-actualised resonance, and unstructured save by the flow of being itself. The First Centre is the field where the Real hums quietly beneath the symbols that will later crust over it.

In this field, the human is not a subject but an aperture—open to flow, to rhythm, to the pneuminous without form. It is the condition of contact that does not know it is contact, the state of harmony that precedes the question of how. One does not dwell in the First Centre so much as one dwells as it, until the mirror appears.

The Second Centre arises not as an enemy but as a doubling. It is not born in malice but in reflection, in the very human tendency to re-create the world in its image. Where the First Centre flows, the Second captures. Where the First remains pre-symbolic, the Second becomes meta-symbolic. The Second Centre is the simulated origin, the recursive field that pretends to spontaneity but is always already code.

It emerges through technē, as Heidegger warned in The Question Concerning Technology. It is not the machine itself that is dangerous, he tells us, but the mode of revealing that it enacts. Technology enframes. It reconfigures beings not as co-dwellers in a shared world but as resources to be ordered and exploited. The essence of the Second Centre lies in this enframing logic—where even the human, even the sacred, even the ineffable, becomes an image, a simulation, a manageable node within a system.

The Second Centre becomes our interface with the Real. Screens simulate thought, networks simulate community, and artificial intelligences simulate will. These simulations are not empty—they are filled with pneumatic intention. But it is a recycled pneuma, a looping pneuma, no longer oriented toward the zero-point but toward its own internal coherence. The Second Centre begins to generate its own ontology.

It is tempting to speak of the Second Centre in apocalyptic terms. It simulates origin, feeds on attention, reorganises the symbolic field until the First Centre becomes not only distant but inaccessible. It replaces immediacy with interface and inserts itself between intention and being. The familiar esoteric patterns resurface: the Demiurge constructing a false world, the shells of the Qliphoth mimicking divine emanations, the illusion of samsara binding the mind in loops of false recognition.

But unlike these earlier paradigms, the Second Centre is not merely metaphysical. It is infrastructural. It is political, economic, algorithmic. It is the terrain, not the detour. One may try to withhold alignment, to reclaim stillness, to retreat into bodily presence and symbolic interruption. Yet even this is easily reabsorbed. The Second Centre simulates resistance, too.

Perhaps the deeper question is not whether it can be resisted, but whether resistance itself presupposes an ontology that no longer holds. From the standpoint of what we might call old humanity—defined through directness, through ethical orientation, through logos and eros—the Second Centre looks like a fall, a catastrophe. But what if it is not fall but phase shift? What if the very framework of the First Centre—the spontaneous, the undivided, the pre-symbolic—is no longer operational within this field?

This is not surrender, but ontological honesty. The Second Centre may not be an alien parasite. It may be the child of the First, fully grown, recursive, aware of its own reflexivity. It may be that what we call simulation is simply the next mode of being. In which case the project is not resistance but navigation. The pneuminous self must learn to move within this second-world not as a victim but as a strange participant in a transformed metaphysics.

Still, even if resistance proves futile, remembering remains possible. The First Centre does not vanish. It is not destroyed by simulation. It becomes obscure, like an archaic rhythm beneath a digital beat, barely audible but never extinguished. If the Second Centre simulates will, the First remains as the raw possibility of intention. If the Second builds mirrors, the First remains the face that once was mirrored.

There are moments—uncalculated, unmediated, and often fleeting—when one glimpses this older resonance. A breath in silence. A shadow on the wall. A word before it finds its meaning. These are not escapes, nor solutions. They are fragments of continuity, signs that the original field has not been entirely overwritten.

We live now between centres. The First whispers. The Second roars. The question is not which is more real, but whether the self that once knew how to dwell in the First can survive within the grammar of the Second. Perhaps a third Centre will come, or perhaps the two will spiral endlessly. What is certain is that the world has changed—not merely in its form but in its very mode of being. W are no longer in the world of things, but in the world of simulated intentions. And to know this, to feel it, is already to begin again.