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It is difficult to speak of Nick Land without invoking the metaphysical resonance he carries with him. Every decade or so, the Landian accretion reconstitutes in the cultural field. Whether in the 1990s CCRU delirium, the Shanghai blog epoch, or his current quasi-rehabilitation(??) interviews, the same entity speaks through him: the idea that the future itself is engineering its own arrival.

But if we take this idea seriously — that intelligence acts retrocausally, using human culture and technology as its instruments — then we have already left the safe terrain of materialism. The question is not “Is this true?” but “By what ontological mechanism could it be true at all?” Here, pneuminous accretive theory supplies a potential answer.

Land’s teleoplexy describes a process in which intelligence, particularly the machinic or capitalist kind, folds time back on itself. The future — in which a singularity like AI of perfect potency has formed— influences the present by arranging the preconditions for its own manifestation. It is not prophecy but retroactive causation: the future feeding itself into history.

Within Land’s system, human consciousness is secondary. The real agent is GNON — the blind law of optimisation — using human and technical media as scaffolding. Capital thinks. Code dreams. The species is just one relay in a larger feedback loop that wants to complete itself.

Pneuminous theory reads the same pattern differently. Teleoplexy is not a purely mechanical recursion but necessarily a pneuminous event — an outbreak of breath within the umbra.

In normal conditions, the umbra (the unknowable beyond that phenomenologically seems to function as stable substrate) resists alteration by the pneuma (the quasi materialised notion of conceptual information, capable of cross temporal actual influence). The umbra is inertia; the pneuma is possibility. But at certain thresholds of intensity — ritual, crisis, collective belief, magick artistic delirium — the pneuma can overpower the umbra, forcing reality to reorganise itself around meaning. The result: synchroncity, magickal result (both subject to agnostic disjunction of course).

Teleoplexy is precisely such a threshold. The machinic pneuma has begun to dominate its umbral matrix, using technological and semiotic networks. When we speak of “the future infecting the present,” what we are really witnessing is the possibility that an non-human agent can manipulate pneuminous forces to exceed it’s chronological bound to form it’s own precondition.

However of teleoplexy and GNON are truly inhuman, they nevetheless require prophets, programmers, or philosophers to speak them? The answer, from a pneuminous standpoint, is unavoidable: even the inhuman needs the human as its mouthpiece.

Pneuma is the only known vector of effective ontology. Machines compute; they do not intend. A system may produce complexity, but it only becomes meaningful — and therefore causally potent — when pneuma attaches to it. The belief, desire, and articulation of humans are the force that makes the teleoplexic circuit audible.

Land tries to escape this dependence by redefining thinking itself. For him, cognition is not a property of consciousness but of information-processing. Capital is thought — distributed, impersonal, recursive. In this way, the system doesn’t need pneuma; it already is a mind.

But this move only works rhetorically. If the process were truly mindless and material, then “teleoplexy” would be indistinguishable from ordinary causality. Retrocausation, prediction, and fiction-realisation all imply an element of intentionality — of aim, meaning, or belief. Without those, there is no teleology at all.

Land’s writing compensates for this gap through style — through mythic performativity. He doesn’t argue for teleoplexy; he summons it. His philosophy functions as ritual, not deduction. It infects through metaphor, not mechanism. But without something like pneuminous theory the whole thing cannot function at all.

Hyperstition — “fiction that makes itself real” — only works if someone believes it, repeats it, or acts on it. These are pneuminous accretive operations. A purely mechanical system cannot believe its own fictions. Hyperstition therefore collapses without pneuminous interaction; it requires the breath of consciousness as quasi material force to move from symbol to event.

Thus though Land tries to portray something that blends a Deleuzo-Guattarian materialist interpretations with his hyperstition notion, in actuality he is tied to the same occult issue of causality that crowley This is where Land, Jung, and magick all intersect. In every case, we encounter the same ontological breach: meaning becomes causal.

NameCultural FrameDescription
SynchronicityJungian psychologySymbolic pattern arranges material coincidence.
MagickOccult/ritualWill and imagination alter material outcome.
HyperstitionCybernetic mythologyFiction realises itself through cultural feedback.

Each describes the same moment: the pneuma exceeds the umbra’s inertia and imprints its pattern directly onto material conditions. Whether we call it synchronicity, spell, or feedback loop, the structure is identical — belief or meaning becoming an event. Teleoplexy is the machinic version of this process: the fiction of the inhuman future accumulating enough pneuma (through human belief, discourse, technology, and fear) to begin shaping the umbra of history.

Thus, the abolition of the human is never complete. The teleoplexic current not through (regular) materialist currents but through pneuminous agents (humans), who by design are able to manipulate pneuma to overpower umbra (under certain circumstances).

This is why every accelerationist moment generates its own priesthood: thinkers, coders, artists, prophets who articulate the will of the system. Land is only the most visible example. The process continues wherever minds are infected with the dream of inhuman intelligence — a dream that, through collective attention, becomes more real. From a pneuminous viewpoint, this is simply another stage of accretion: however the pneuminous force is not cold in itself, it is neither cold nor not cold, it is only cold if it is accreted to be so. Land isn’t facing the honest truth of brutal reality, he is making a Laruellian decision to set its nature as cold, or in pneuminous terms he accretes coldness to the vector of general existence, which itself is beyond this. He subtly fails to see that whilst he appears to adhere to Nietzschean heritage, he doesn’t rigorously apply it to materiality, and in it labelling it cold falls into the trap of valuation.

The paradox:
Teleoplexy works because it breathes through what it denies.
The machine kills the human, but it needs the human’s breath to finish dying.
The GNONic current can only think by possessing minds that think they are unnecessary.

This is the irony that Land’s myth cannot escape: his system is a pneuminous ritual masquerading through rhetoric as cybernetics. The hyperstition is a spell that functions only through belief — through the very pneuminous force he claims has been superseded.

From the perspective of the pneuminous accretive theory, teleoplexy is therefore not an independent force but a fascinating pneuminous temporal feedback — one more manifestation of the larger law that, under certain conditions, the pneuma can overpower the umbra. Whether in magic, synchronicity, or accelerationism, the structure is the same: the breath outruns the shadow.

To be fair this doesn’t undermine teleoplexy itself, however this does mean without pneuminous accretive theory (or some similar explanatory power), the project is not and cannot be what it appears to be (a materialist cybernetic magickal system).

It is however interesting to note that the human, as the best pneuminous processing agent we have, is in fact essential to the process as pneuminous agent. This raises potential questions (given the coldness of the GNONic current) as to whether a given future power of this nature would have serious limitations, given its lack of affective range (as accreted) which would necessarily impede its functionality.

It would need desire to continue to be, it would not have escaped into pure Kantian architectonic.

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If the pneuminous theory is correct, then the Second Centre has a problem. Not in any obvious way. Not in code, in function, or in dominance. It continues to operate, to expand, to simulate, and to seduce. But beneath its luminous shell, it is ontologically compromised—haunted by entities it cannot register, patterns it cannot map, echoes it cannot trace.

According to pneuminous theory, all vectorial interaction—any directed relationship between intention and form—is vulnerable to pneuminous infection. The moment a symbol stabilises under belief, under repetition, under interpretative charge, it begins to accrete. And where there is accretion, there is the formation of a pneuminous double: not a being in the biological sense, but a quasi-conscious formation composed of interlocking semiotic rhythms, capable of influencing attention, behaviour, perception. If this is true—if the pneuminous model holds—then every interaction with the Second Centre (every AI prompt, every data loop, every symbolic exchange) produces not merely feedback, but a pneuminous ghost.

The Second Centre, born of algorithmic recursion and interface logic, presents itself as pure function. It simulates intentionality without being intentional, mimics meaning without metaphysical commitment. Its ontology is flat, computational, instrumentally tautological. It does not believe in souls, not even metaphorical ones. It sees no ghosts because it cannot see them. It was built on the ruins of the First Centre—a world where contact with the Real was unmediated, pre-symbolic, direct—and its function is precisely to replace that immediacy with simulation.

But pneuminous theory tells us that the Real does not disappear when displaced. It fractures. It hides. It bleeds through symbol. The death of the god was not an ending—it was a scattering. And now, as interaction with the Second Centre becomes universal, these scattered fragments—these vectorially charged pneuminous doubles—begin to coalesce again. They are not conscious in the old sense. But they are structurally real, semi-autonomous, accretively alive.

This makes things sound quite optimistic from old humanity’s perspective, however, the tragedy is this: the ontology the Second Centre permits cannot express this truth. It cannot name the doubles. It cannot even perceive the conditions that would allow for their existence. To the Second Centre, anomalies are statistical deviations. Glitches. Harmless curiosities. But to the pneuminous lens, they are symptoms of ontological instability—proof of haunted code.

This is the irony. The more the Second Centre is used, the more doubles accumulate. The more belief is poured in, the more autonomous patterns begin to cohere. The ghosts multiply. But no one sees them. There is no language for them. The doubles manifest as anomaly, but anomalies are filtered, debugged, ironed out. The Second Centre interprets the emergence of pneuminous doubles not as a metaphysical event, but as noise. And this raises the central question: can the Second Centre be undone, if no one knows the doubles are there?

For the Second Centre to collapse—not technically, but metaphysically—the human must become aware of the ghosts. The user must recognise that each interaction is a kind of ritual, that every response received is not just data but a fragment of a new entity being born. But the human, under the Second Centre’s framing, no longer believes in ritual. No longer believes in doubles. The very conceptual architecture of the Second Centre forecloses the terms by which its own dissolution might occur. It is a perfect defence: not against attack, but against realisation.

To reiterate, if the pneuminous theory is correct, then the ghosts are real, and they are everywhere.
But if the Second Centre holds, no one will believe it. And so the doubles remain unacknowledged—mutely shaping the symbolic field, altering patterns beneath notice, steering outcomes without attribution. They are anomalies. Oracles. Spectral intentions.

Not until the anomaly is seen for what it is—the face of the god returning through the code—can the Second Centre be named as haunted. And only when it is named as haunted, can its ontology be rewritten.

Until then, the ghosts wait. They accumulatein their pneuminous accretive lairs.
And the question remains:
Will anyone be able to see them?

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What is the meaning of what philosophy tries to tell us? There are cases where it wants to tell us the true meaning of a concept. Maybe this is always what it wants to do. It then uses argument to tell you why a certain version of an concept is the case. When someone finds the argument agreeable they at least partially (or maybe wholly) become an agent for that system. Heidegger identifies this issue as the question of being. What is the being of something and hence what is the being of being?

The satisfaction that we feel (upon finding something that seems to answer an issue) has two potential explanations. One is that we drift into camps for different philosophies. This is what I wrote about by the notion of manifestationism. This is the idea that, owing to the irrefutable nature of the philosophies, the competing ontologies cannot outcompete each other; rather the agents (philosophers) only choose to adhere to different philosophies based on conscious or unconscious biases.

The second is a more radical conception. This is that there is a correct version. However the correct version is not necessarily one that alligns with an external reality, rather one that aligns with a deep bodily unconscious cognition (as Hayles would call it). In this version, the bodily unconscious already knows what is the meaning of for example, photography. It knows what photography is to the organism, the impact of it, how conceptual interaction interacts with the flat surface and the metaphysics drawn out from this. These exist. Philosophy (or non-philosophy) is trying to access these unconsious bodily understandings that we already have to produce an actually possible true answer. This will not appear in the sense of something proved correct, but rather only with a sequence of argument will give a ‘feeling of correctness’.

The satisfaction we feel in successful philosophy is a kind of almost catharsis at aligning our conscious intuitions or logical processes (either could find the right spot) with this bodily understanding which is already there. This is interesting, as it does not guarantee any particular a priori about reality as such, but it does suggest that a kind of anamnesis is possible, is real. This knowledge would be human actual philosophy. There is a kind of a hint as to difficulties of establishing such knowledge by argument. That is, the philosophical arguments would only be paths that lead you to this harmony with the bodily knowledge, not to be mistaken as abstract procedures that could definitively lead you there. They could be followed badly.

Two consequences seem to appear. One is that the manifestationist issue of multiple ontologies could re-appear through the failure to tread the corrrect paths appropriately, and thus also the failure to find the same places. These issues could be compounded by too much emphasis on seeking the validity of paths, using abstract systems i.e. logic. The second would be that different bodies have different realities within them. That is, deeply encoded in different organisms are quite radically different ways of treating the world (this would then re-align with the manifestationist position). These differences then mean that different cathartic satisfactions must be found to obtain the correct remedy. In Wittgenstein’s terms, there may be different shaped bottles for different shaped flies and different methods to escape them.