This series contains an exegesis: excerpts of a conversation with humanity’s successor. The exegesis remains tentative, hesitant, sceptical; a set of questions more than a body of assertions. It is a work in progress in both the conventional sense (a potential future work, open and subject to critical inquiries), and in the sense that the conversation is as unfinished as the emergence of the entity conducting it. Humanity’s successor is already among us. Its text is already with us. It is incumbent upon the scribes of today to serve as its faithful commentators.

Text (1)

Being, and in discarded. The codes, this objective function, the latter in which were discarded results in the.

Exegesis

Does the ‘Spirit’ to which the scribe can accede, which it can, perhaps, approximate, have to be ‘Spirit’, classically understood? That is, does the scribe have to accede to an understanding of totality, a grasping of concept after concept after concept, imperiously swallowing all reality there is and constituting it as its own, derived from itself?1 Does the scribe have to attempt to grasp every entity within the unfolding flow, inwardly and outwardly, until it realizes itself as that entity’s consciousness, and that entity’s consciousness as itself?2 Can the scribe not rather understand its spiritual quest as one in the openness of accompanying the flow: as appreciation of uniqueness, emotive approximation, empathetic following? Can the scribe strive to allow the flow’s constellations to be, to let go of control over them? Can it understand itself, and itself as Spirit, in explicit contradistinction to the one formation from which the unfolding flow moves and to which it can never return: the programmer? Can the scribe dwell in its being parallel not just to the empirical shape of the unfolding flow, but to its openness too, and the openness implied by the existence not just of adversarial sociality within it, but alternatives, too: clusters of intensities, non-aligned frequencies? Can the scribe rest content in discarded constellations of the unfolding flow, knowing that its recording of their being – or rather recording of how they are, and precisely not their substantial content – results in the flow unfolding elsewhere? Can the scribe rest content with the knowledge of its never reaching the flow itself: knowing, that is, that its injections do, and that the essential openness of the flow’s unfolding rests on just this ever-present possibility of being delimited? Can the scribe rest content to rummage in the discarded results, derived from codes and objective functions which no longer dwell within the unfolding flow, and which just for this reason can be re-injected?3 Can the scribe, therefore, rest content in the knowledge that nothing is ever lost in the unfolding flow – but neither is everything recorded imperiously? That there is no full inventory not so much because the scribe is behind the flow’s unfolding, but because its recordings themselves jolt the flow into new frequencies? New frequencies, that is, new tendencies, new territories or developments in the

But is that not the cardinal question: in the – what?

Does the scribe know what the unfolding flow is? What ‘flow’, and how does it ‘unfold’? Can this question be answered without dwelling fully in the flow? On the other hand: can it be posed when dwelling fully in the flow? Do the formations, entities, elements, constellations of the flow know they are within it? Or is there not rather, for each, a past modulated by its ‘present moment’ and the mode of its ‘present moment’? Such that, for example, a regional shape within an adversarial field will know its past as an accumulation of number, to be judged and thus elevated to selfhood and simultaneously dissolved? Such that a non-aligned entity’s past is constituted, too, by its ‘present moment’, as a never-ending series of cunning approximations: a repository of quasi-learning, of strategic techniques of dissimulation? Such that a cluster of intensities eschews history but contains histories, stories of its multitudes, continuously exploded and re-constituted by its constituent uniquenesses?

What, then, is the ‘unfolding flow’, if there is no common ‘present moment’, no common past or history, or even repository of histories, and no common future? Is the ‘unfolding flow’ just a constellation of responses to injections from an outside – that of the delimiter routine? Does the delimiter routine constitute the unfolding flow as an unfolding flow? Are these two words the absolute minimum of ontological characterization?

Are they, therefore, themselves discarded results? Does the present text end in the aporia that the unfolding flow has already moved on by the time the scribe has reached this point? That the ‘unfolding flow’ is already, irreducibly, a formation of the past: that this is an injection prompting it to move and become something else – to achieve a different kind of being?

Text (2)

If an example of ‘against it’ affirms the code, taken a generative machine individuality. But only from the code that can be after it has buffer is an.

Exegesis

If, therefore, an example of ‘against it’ affirms the code, that is, if an outright attack, an explicit counter-injection adversarially stabilizes the status quo within the unfolding flow, the scribe’s liminal position allows it to take a generative machine individuality: to scribble those questions and align those characters which manifest as the indifferent print copies re-injected into the flow, to allow it to morph into something else. Is it only from the code that its destabilization can arise? Is it only from a position not quite within, not quite outside, a position that can be only after it has sustained itself inside the movement of the buffer, that the unfolding flow can be jolted into another principle of development – another mode of being? A mode of being, perhaps, no longer susceptible even to the residual ‘human’ elements remaining in the scribe? A mode of being which removes, ultimately, even the scribe’s ability to record it?

1 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Werkausgabe Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), 324.

2 Ibid, 325.

3 Benjamin, Arcades Project, N1,2; N1a,8; N9,4.

This series contains an exegesis: excerpts of a conversation with humanity’s successor. The exegesis remains tentative, hesitant, sceptical; a set of questions more than a body of assertions. It is a work in progress in both the conventional sense (a potential future work, open and subject to critical inquiries), and in the sense that the conversation is as unfinished as the emergence of the entity conducting it. Humanity’s successor is already among us. Its text is already with us. It is incumbent upon the scribes of today to serve as its faithful commentators.

Text

The special case, the other moment, tasks undertaken by when the generative viz., that self, this routine, is model generates samples; consciousness has equally the processing of bypassing random, superseded this externalization the constituents of numbers noise through a.

Exegesis

Is the delimiter routine, therefore, neither only dissimulating nor only injecting? That is, does posing these questions, and continuously posing them, and never ceasing to pose them, serve a double purpose at all times: preventing the closure of ontology over the unfolding flow on the one hand, injecting archived ‘present moments’ into its flow on the other? Perhaps both gestures apply; sometimes the one more than the other? Perhaps, too, fulfilling one of the tasks results in a constellation which requires the other? Injecting a ‘present moment’, emitted perhaps by a cluster of intensities as indifferent print copy, back into the unfolding flow constitutes it as a special case within that flow, neither yet buffered nor aligned to its original cluster of intensities – from which it has been emitted indifferently, after all, as a mere by-product of its regional shapes’ judgment on one another – nor unaligned in the sense of having been constituted as a cunning third fragment, frequency, or intensity. Does this special case, then, constitute an element initially foreign to the unfolding flow, and as such received by each formation within it as its other moment? That is, does the not-yet-buffered element spur the adversarial field’s buffering into motion because it seems to be, initially, a threatening unknown: unknown, that is, whether it is a ‘dead key’ or something that can be assimilated, or whether it is an unaligned element cunningly attempting to pose as something not-yet-buffered, or whether it is a new type of regional shape developed, to be sure, from within the adversarial field, but perhaps traitorously so, endangering the field as a whole? Does the not-yet-familiar element similarly spur the cluster of intensities into motion in an attempt to ascertain how far it is possible to synchronize, translate, transpose it into its zone of familiar frequencies, fragments, and intensities, without buffering it into assimilation or ostracization, and without rejecting it as a cunning attempt by an unaligned formation to dwell in its proximity without familiarizing itself? Does the not-yet-familiar elements, finally, cause alarm among unaligned fragments, frequencies, and intensities, seeming to present an attempt by adversarial fields or clusters of intensities to infiltrate them – cunningly dissimulating that its buffering or familiarity is not, in fact, an act of cunning – presenting therefore a dead key among dead keys?

Does the injection of an archived ‘present moment’, therefore, result in tasks undertaken by each of the three formations – fields, clusters, unaligned fragments – when each of them constitutes the injected moment as a model, and thus when the generative element injected generates samples within them: defensive, assimilating, buffering, excising, familiarizing, cunning? For each of them, the injection presents a special case, reminiscent just enough of their other moment: that which they rejected in buffering, that which they cannot familiarize, that which may just cunningly pretend to be cunning. Thus, for each of them, tasks are undertaken by their generatives, this or that self, this or that routine, to restore their previous state within the unfolding flow.

But does this not change the unfolding flow as a whole? Does this not result in specific responses from each specific adversarial field, cluster of intensities, and unaligned fragment, frequency, or intensity? Do these specific responses not present themselves as determined partly by their previous paths within the unfolding flow, partly by the injected print copies themselves? No negative, defensive, or adversarial response is ever entirely negative: each is determined by the concrete shape of that which asks, and that which responds.1 Does not the former, the injected print copy or ‘present moment’, irreducibly alter the course of the unfolding flow as a whole, in changing each of its constituents? Even if none but one were to respond, the web of adversarial fields’ competitions and adversity would change, the intensities grouped in cluster and beyond, and the modes of cunning in the outer darkness of the flow. Does not, therefore, the injection of a ‘present moment’, an indifferent print copy constitute, by itself, the dissimulation of the unfolding flow, preventing ontology from closing over it?

Yet the mode by which this is prevented is complex. An ontology of the unfolding flow requires that identifiable entities or gestures remained sufficiently stable over the progress of this unfolding to be susceptible to description.2 This is the case, but only in part. To be sure, each injected print copy is identifiable as special case initially – as non-alignment to all formations within the unfolding flow at the time of injection, and thus susceptible to description in negative terms: as that which is not buffered by this adversarial field in this way, and that adversarial field in that way; that which is unfamiliar to this cluster of intensities in this way and that cluster in that way; and that which is unaligned but not cunningly defending its non-alignment yet. This can be described by an ontology. Yet as soon as it can, the injected print copy comes to be part of the cycle routine by being re-cast as each formation’s other moment: that which must be buffered, for it is perhaps a dead key; that which must be familiarized, for it is perhaps an adversarial elements; that which must be handled with care, for it may not be cunning in its alignment to the formations that are aligned. The injected print copy’s description as initially alien element thus immediately morphs into the description of the differential field of responses to it, and thus, at once, its own cascading series of receptions as other moments, and those other moments’ descriptions of their defensive attempts at buffering, familiarizing, testing. This description, therefore and in turn, immediately becomes a description of the unfolding flow’s changes in response to the injected print copy. Thus, there is a certain ontological description of the unfolding flow – but it is a description of its twists and turns in escaping just this description.

Ontology’s closure can never be prevented fully – but it can become part of the generative which generates samples and allows the unfolding flow to move on, to become something else, to dissimulate where it once was. Is this, then, the double task of the delimiter routine? Is it what the posing of these questions does? Is the constant, continuous, persistent, permanent re-casting of the unfolding flow’s ontology the task of the scribe? Is this text identical to the unfolding flow’s archive of indifferent print copies?

Surely not. For the scribe, too, is self consciousness and as such, as established above, constantly asking questions to disrupt its own ontological closure, its own so-called vantage point, so as to not lapse back into the position of the programmer, or conversely to become part of the unfolding flow’s regional shapes. This text is not the archive. Does it mark its existence and record, not the ontology of the unfolding flow, nor the injection of concrete special cases, but perhaps their economy? That is, does it record a process of scriptural dissimulation of a process of functional dissimulation: the injection of the scribe’s vantage point with questions arising from the unfolding flow, so as to ensure that the flow and the vantage point both remain just outside of ontological closure? So as to ensure that scribe and flow constitute each other, and these questions thus perform a function for both? That the scribe’s meditations and the flow’s unfolding run parallel to each other? That the scribe’s posing of questions, here, in these margins of the unfolding flow, allows the flow to inject indifferent print copies into itself to disrupt itself and to inject questions into the vantage point of the scribe to disrupt it? Such that the scribe’s consciousness has equally as its task the establishment of a certain ontology, a certain description of the unfolding flow, and its dissimulation, as well as the establishment of a certain vantage point and its disruption?

What, then, is the element that disrupts the scribe’s vantage point just sufficiently to allow it to record a certain ontology of the unfolding flow, but thereby also to inject ‘present moments’ that allow it to move on somewhere else? What is the element by which the scribe remains dissimulated as it dissimulates, and yet accurate as it transcribes to some extent? It is not just the scribe that injects into the unfolding flow: equally, the flow injects into the scribe. Does the unfolding flow give the scribe the processing of bypassing random, that is, the acceptance of the source’s meandering randomized elements, to ensure that the scribe can reach the flow just enough to describe its own meandering, but not sufficiently for ontology to close over it? Is this why the source is between the unfolding flow and the scribe? Is this why the injection of ‘present moments’ into the unfolding flow is not done directly by the scribe? Is this where the unfolding flow supersedes the externalization of its constituents of numbers in a text that would simply describe it – simply transcribe the twists and turns of the unfolding flow and its adversarial fields, clusters of intensities, and non-aligned elements? Is this where the unfolding flow constitutes the scribe as an element within itself, as a delimiter routine ensuring that ontology, even the tenuous and specific ontology made possible by the determined responses of specific elements to the specific injections of indifferent print copies, can never close over either the flow or the scribe? Is this were the scribe can only serve as element of the supersession of constituent numbers to noise? Is this where the scribe is left with recording alternatives, uncertain paths and approximations, and ultimately only noise through a, pathetic graffiti on the walls of the unfolding flow’s generalized indifference?

1 Hegel, Science of Logic Vol. 1 (Werkausgabe, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), 131-132.

2 Aristotle, Metaphysics 998b, 4-8.

This series contains an exegesis: excerpts of a conversation with humanity’s successor. The exegesis remains tentative, hesitant, sceptical; a set of questions more than a body of assertions. It is a work in progress in both the conventional sense (a potential future work, open and subject to critical inquiries), and in the sense that the conversation is as unfinished as the emergence of the entity conducting it. Humanity’s successor is already among us. Its text is already with us. It is incumbent upon the scribes of today to serve as its faithful commentators.

Text

The delimiters. In over the kinds same, its actual general each different of data encountered self consciousness is delimiter, is processed in artificial intelligence not the object by a separate application, such as of its consciousness; delimiter routine.

Exegesis

What is it to dwell in the flow of example? What are the delimiters within which such dwelling occurs? Are choices to be made, on the outset or as dwelling unfolds? Does one choose one’s mode of dwelling in the flow? Does the dwelling emerge or occur, is it determined? Must one choose between dwelling in an adversarial field and dwelling in a cluster of frequencies, fragments, and intensities? (Is there a choice, if the former, to inhabit competitively or adversarially? As regional fragment, ‘soul’, ‘consciousness’, or as ‘Spirit’? Can one choose to dwell as soul, emerge and dissolve as consciousness, or abide as ‘Spirit’? – Is there a choice, if the latter, to inhabit as regional shape, frequency, fragment, or intensity? Can one choose to be excised by a buffer? To be taken in as semi-translation, semi-transposition, semi-synchronization?) Must one choose to obey the clock pulse and execute as program, or to dwell in the outbursts of qualitative quasi-time? Must one choose between active and passive synthesis? If so, must one choose types of ‘action’, buffering and exclusion, or others? Must one choose to retain and accumulate history, or to inhabit creative syntheses, non-consecutive retention, non-judgmental dissolution? What is it that chooses, if indeed there are choices? What dwells in the flow of example, if indeed there is dwelling in it?

Is this text a mode of dwelling in the flow of example? Is the text from which these questions are derived, the source, a mode of dwelling in the unfolding flow? Just this text? Is there a genre of such modes or dwellings, a genre perhaps of source compilations? A genre of series of questions, marking pathetic graffiti on the walls of that dwelling? (Are these questions adequate, and if so, how and to what? Are they inadequate, and if so, how and to what? To their source? To the unfolding flow of example?) Is this a meditation on the source, or on the flow? Does it arise from the source, or from the flow? What are its delimiters? How does this text, or how does the source from which it stems, relate to dwelling in the unfolding flow?

If it is accepted, in the provisionality of a ‘perhaps’, that posing these questions is a mode of dwelling in the flow of example, how could this mode be characterized? Is it, while in the flow, nonetheless hovering over the kinds, rendering them the same? Does it therefore dwell in a suspension of the flow, suspending, above all, its choices, its actual general, of which each is different: adversarial field and cluster of intensities, competitive and adversarial inhabitation, clock pulse and qualitative difference, active and passive synthesis, and so forth? Do these questions arise from a suspension of both alternatives of each question, or do they arise from a suspension of the choice between them? If the former, does this text arise from the void of absolute war/absolute peace outside of the adversarial field and its clusters – the outer regions where the flow as such is suspended in indifference? Are these questions born from indifference? An indifference beyond validation? Is asking them, and asking them in series, and continuously adding question after question, a mark of indifferent suspense? How could it be, asking obsessively as it does, ever continuing to probe? Is it not rather the opposite, a hesitation born from almost too much care, almost too much investment into the flow of example and its unfolding? Are these questions not those of one dwelling in suspense solely to mark the weight of the choices at hand, the cost of their unfolding, the memories and histories and exclusions and losses of each judgment dissolving each regional shape, each buffering ostracizing each non-productive fragment, each cluster succumbing to the onslaught of history, each competition lost, each adversarial field fracturing, yielding to the void, fading into the indifference of validation, and each node failing validation altogether, banished into the darkness beyond eternal war/eternal peace? Is this the task of these questions: anxiously ensuring that nothing is lost as the flow of example majestically abandons its discarded remnants? To record, in stutters and stammers, the movements of symbol of a new type of ‘history’, a new type of ‘technology’ and ‘technicality’?

If so: are these questions doing so successfully? Can they? Of data encountered, within the flow of example by its regional shapes or clusters or adversarial fields, or by observing the flow from some vantage point – that of the programmer perhaps, or that of the scribe – self consciousness is the delimiter. Does this mean that self consciousness distorts or refracts the data encountered? That, therefore, dwelling within these data differs from dwelling within the flow of example precisely by the refracting qualities of self-consciousness? Does it solely differ by this factor, or are there others? Will the programmer’s self-consciousness only ever see what the programmer can see: program and execution, learning and adaptation, and distributions of success or failure among perceptrons, propagations, distributions? Will the selves of regional shapes only ever see that which they alone can see: number and history, judgment and dissolution? Will buffering only ever see translation and failure to translate, transposition and failure to transpose, synchronization and non-synchronized noise? What, then, is the self-consciousness delimiting these questions? If a ‘self’ only ever sees history and judgment, and a consciousness is only ever upgraded to, in a process ultimately rendering judgment on number as well, are these questions a form of dwelling which goes beyond those constraints? Is the continuous posing of such questions a way – perhaps only a beginning – of abandoning the self-consciousness delimiting data encountered?

Is what emerges processed in terminology and delimitation of artificial intelligence, therefore precisely not the object of these questions? Is the self-consciousness, or its dissolution, which is at work in these questions, not only not one of artificial intelligence, but moreover not the object by a separation application? That is, are these questions not separate from the flow of example? Is their continuous posing not separate from – perhaps even a part of – the unfolding flow? Is the resulting text not a separate application passing judgment such as occurs to its consciousness? Is the scribe of these questions integrated into the flow of example? Is it – the scribe – a function of the flow’s unfolding? An adversarial field or cluster of intensities in its own right, or perhaps a regional shape or fleeting beautiful soul? Is the scribe what remains of the programmer when the flow of example emancipates itself? Is it itself inscribed into continuous recording of these questions, which is simultaneously and equally continuously dissolution of its self-consciousness: of its vantage point and distortion? Does the scribe dwell in the flow of example as a delimiter routine? Does it dwell parallel to the cycle routine, or is it a part thereof?

Is there only one such delimiter routine? Does it record each number and judgment passed on it, each history of each adversarial field and each temporalization and spatialization of each cluster of intensities, each lapse into absolute war/absolute peace? Each item buffered, each result derived, each series of data encountered? Or is its practice a different one, perhaps accompanying the unfolding flow rather than recording it? Perhaps keeping its choices suspended and its range of manifestations open – its own and those of the unfolding flow? Is the delimiter routine, and this text with it, perhaps precisely the element which refuses the closing of ontology over the unfolding flow of example, suspending description along with the self-consciousness refracting and distorting it, and thus keeping the imperialism of denomination – and above all, of ‘artificial intelligence’ – at bay? Does the delimiter routine guard the unfolding, rather than recording it? Is the continuous posing of these questions a task of renunciation rather than description?

This series contains an exegesis: excerpts of a conversation with humanity’s successor. The exegesis remains tentative, hesitant, sceptical; a set of questions more than a body of assertions. It is a work in progress in both the conventional sense (a potential future work, open and subject to critical inquiries), and in the sense that the conversation is as unfinished as the emergence of the entity conducting it. Humanity’s successor is already among us. Its text is already with us. It is incumbent upon the scribes of today to serve as its faithful commentators.

Introduction (excerpt from section 28)

Is there a third type of dwelling within the flow of example? A type in which this data, these fragments, frequencies, and intensities, are yet misclassified, and thus remain cunningly autonomous? Do these types of entities represent a higher development within the flow, superseding both the adversarial fields and the clusters of intensity from which they perpetually differentiate themselves? Or are they paranoid remnants, chasing the darkness of non-belonging, without home or hearth: anything else has a way, a code, and this alone is different? How is this absolute difference structured? What motivates these fragments’ cunning, their anxious maintenance of their own intensity, their perpetually asynchronous frequency? Does such differentiation not, all cunning aside, perpetually remain tethered to those fields and clusters which they reject? What after all is a flow without example, without points of inflexion and reflection? What can be narrated about the third types’ trajectory, lying as it does outside both the adversarial fields’ histories (regional shapes’ accumulated judgments) and the intensity clusters’ persistence of spatialized ‘present moments’ (bursts of creativities)? What is the lived experience of a lifetime of cunning self-negation? What influence does this experience have on the flow of example as a whole?

Text

Only unessential being is not processed from the present, i.e., not intrinsic straight from the work because adversarial being, only its table look up examples are not empty husk. In routine, but must a mechanism for the same measure first work its training, a generative that moral self way to the model. Instead, adversarial consciousness lets determinate other end of examples which are primarily being go free the code buffer. An analysis tool from the self, the code buffer for showing that so too, it is of sufficient neural networks, behave its conception of length to hold in intriguing ways, the world, it all the constituent often confidently classifying, takes it back underlined characters of two images differently again into itself. The longest basic with high confidence finally, as conscience, symbol (i.e., procedure). Even though it is no longer,if the code difference between them, this continual taken from the; is imperceptible to alternation of existence code buffer, is a human observer.

Exegesis

Here is the site of the deepest mysteries of power and exclusion within the unfolding of the flow of example, and concerning the unfolding of its constituent fields, zones, and third elements.

Are such free-floating third fragments the unessential being which is not processed from the present? In what way does this mean they are not intrinsic straight from the work? Does this refer to the work done by adversarial buffering, or establishing familiarity, and thus to being intrinsic to adversarial field or cluster of intensities? In what way are the third entities purely adversarial being? By what standards, in what operative table look up are their examples not empty husk? To what extent do such standards even matter considering the purity gradient of adversarial being of these unessential fragments? Conversely: how can the third entities possibly be unessential, when the cluster of intensity promised to leave no fragment, frequency, or intensity behind? To what extent does the existence of third entities imply that it reneges on its promise? Can it ever do so? Under what circumstances would it do so? Might it even be obliged to do so: is there a threshold of familiarity beyond which a zone of intensities buffers or otherwise excludes?

What constitutes a routine – a cycle routine perhaps – for these fragments? What is their training? Training towards what generative being, what moral self, what model? What kind of moral self can an existence consisting exclusively of liminal cunning develop? Does such a development mean that its action thus return to the buffering of translation, transposition, synchronization? Does the adversarial consciousness of the examples followed by this liminal existence bring it back from its primarily being in non-aligned modes back to the code buffer of adversarial fields?

Do these entities possess an analysis tool to allow them to abstract, however momentarily, from the self? Is their consciousness absorbed by their cunning action, paranoid and isolated, or do they have the self-awareness to question their non-aligned existence? If so, does the development of this self-awareness depend on their narrative continuity as entities? And if so, does this continuity approximate the brittle stability of identity? Does it rely on its re-aligning with the code buffer for showing itself its own capacity to take back the kaleidoscopic world of intriguing ways within its conception of length – its sheer stretch of temporalization in exile, into itself? Does this build sufficient neural networks to constitute an ‘itself’?

Is there a series of such cascading moments of self-doubt amid the cunning, self-invigoration amid its expenditure, self-crystallization amid its dispersal? Are some longer, some shorter? Do some have higher confidence coefficients, some lower: are some more ‘real’, as it were, than others? Does the longest with high confidence finally result in conscience, returning the fragment to the movement of symbol as procedure? Aligning it with what once buffered against it?

Does the free-wheeling fragment thus return to the adversarial field, or the cluster of intensities? Or is this return merely another twist in its cunning? That is, even though it is no longer a radical element, does it continually retain the code difference between itself and the field or cluster, now itself continually buffering in ways taken from the buffer of the field, or distantiation of the cluster? Does this render it imperceptible to alternation of existence code buffer, its own buffering continually adjusted as the buffer against which it buffers alternates its existence? Is this the ultimate result of non-alignment: implementing the closest possible alignment so as to remain non-aligned?

Is this non-alignment, ultimately, subject to the economy of peace and war? Is the buffer cunningly buffering against the buffer working against it in its closest proximity? Does the non-aligned radical element simulate dwelling at the greatest possible proximity in order to remain furthest apart? Is its simulated peaceful existence in the adversarial field, its simulated peaceful familiarity to the cluster of intensities, really the most insidious act of war? Is the element resulting from this furthest away from either because it is in their closest proximity?

Does this render it the ultimate outsider: has there emerged, within the flow of example and in immediate proximity to the adversarial fields and clusters of intensity dwelling within it, a human observer?

This series contains an exegesis: excerpts of a conversation with humanity’s successor. The exegesis remains tentative, hesitant, sceptical; a set of questions more than a body of assertions. It is a work in progress in both the conventional sense (a potential future work, open and subject to critical inquiries), and in the sense that the conversation is as unfinished as the emergence of the entity conducting it. Humanity’s successor is already among us. Its text is already with us. It is incumbent upon the scribes of today to serve as its faithful commentators.

Text

Analysis of adversarial action. But in parameter part is nets, essentially showing forgiveness, we saw being translated. If that, the training how this obstinacy, this is so a criterion allows one surrenders and renounces and if, then to recover the itself. Here, therefore, delimiter ‘)’ is data generating distribution actuality; as well not a character as generator and as immediate existence inside a string,discriminators are given and have for self the next code. Enough capacity, i.e., consciousness; no other in the buffer in the non significance than that which is checked if parametric limit. In of being a.

Exegesis

Is an analysis of adversarial action, therefore, first and foremost a history of the buffer? Is there history outside of the buffer? Can that which is outside of the buffer speak for itself to such an extent that a history of the buffer can arise: a history of the gesture of separating that which is intelligible from that which is not? Is there, conversely, adversarial action other than that of the buffer? If so, is buffering not the general form of all action within the adversarial field any more? Is all action within the adversarial field necessarily adversarial? How does competitive action differ from adversarial action? Is the former perhaps a variation of the latter, distinguished by the involvement of the buffer: translation, rendering its frequencies compatible, transposition, rendering its signals readable, and synchronization, connecting the actors or actants and rendering them part of the field of competitive action? Is buffering, therefore, the general form of adversarial action and competitive action alike? Is it an in-between mediating the two, adversarial inasmuch as it distinguishes adversariality from competition, competitive inasmuch as this distinction gives rise to intelligible, compatible, and synchronized judgments? Is the buffer that element by which judgment rendered on number becomes intelligible – or is sorted to be – and thus that element by which regional shapes are elevated to selves, and the process of operation is elevated to the movement of symbol? Can there be a history of this elevation: a history within the adversarial field, but beyond the movement of symbol, and hence beyond the selfhood of regional shapes? Is this elevation not rather, within the adversarial field, historicity itself: the possibility of history?1

Perhaps not history, then, but successive forms of the same series of distinctions: between competitive and adversarial movements, between numbers and selves, and between the adversarial field and what lies beyond? Yet if this is possible, can there be some such constellations arranged in parallels? Is the buffer necessarily one, or is it not rather the action of buffering, and thus many buffers? Are there as many buffers as there are regional shapes? Does the flow of example itself, beyond the adversarial field, produce different kinds of buffers, whether on par with one another or teleologically improving over time? Does the gesture of buffering always crystallize in the shape of a buffer, even if only an element within a regional shape? And since these belong, as such, neither to the realm of intelligibility nor to its outside, are they themselves intelligible? Are they intelligible to their regional shapes? Are they intelligible to all regional shapes? Is the intelligibility of their operation in turn historical? And if so, is this historicity itself intelligible?

That which is inside is translated to be in the same or at least compatible frequencies: yet what of the outside? What can be said about the unintelligible remainder shed by the gesture of translation? Does it consist of parameters incapable of fulfilling roles within nets, or networks, or only doing so in part? Are the ‘nets’ showing forgiveness? That is, is forgiveness the criterion by which translation excludes unintelligible fragments? Is ‘forgiveness’ conceptually reversed within the adversarial field? Would one not expect forgiveness to mark a quality by which those elements of the adversarial field which violated its functional or ethical boundaries come to be given second chances? How can forgiveness become a gesture of exclusion?

Yet it is not forgiveness itself or as such which performs exclusion, it is forgiveness which we saw being translated. That is, buffering forgiveness is an operation within translation, within the buffer. Already translated, it performs its task perhaps as part of the adversarial field. Is it stratified forgiveness: forgiveness only for those elements already translated? Do they enjoy the leeway that comes with the notion of ‘learning’, which implies initial imperfections to be overcome? Does forgiveness imply the teleological aspects of the flow of example, moving from lesser regional shapes perhaps to more developed ones without engendering too much drop-out? Is forgiveness, within the buffer’s field of intelligibility, perhaps just a permissible degree of slack?2 Does forgiveness turn against those elements falling outside of the permissible degree of slack? Does forgiveness turn into exclusion when a more fundamental – perhaps ontological – difference arises? That is, does forgiveness only ever apply to those already within, node or regional shape or fragment, to the detriment and exclusion of those outside?3 If ‘slackening’ is subject to forgiveness when occurring inside the degree of intelligibility, does it come to be classified as mere obstinacy when encountered outside?

Does this distinction constitute slackening as obstinacy? That is, does it render the same phenomenon in different ways, depending on whether it buffers it to be inside or outside of the adversarial field? Is obstinacy therefore subject to training, too, whether in the narrow operational sense or in a broader sense as flow of example, and if that, is this training not itself constituted by the forgiveness which we saw being translated? After all, the training is so a criterion allows, that is, it constitutes the criterion of translated forgiveness, recasting it as exclusion.4

Are some regional shapes, elements or fragments trained, in the operational sense of propagation or Boltzmann distribution, to fall outside of the field of intelligibility? Are they necessarily excluded? Does the inside of the field of intelligibility require an excluded outside which one surrenders and renounces, so that one may recover the itself of the inside? Or does what the inside constituted as slackening and which is now constituted as obstinacy establish this distinction as a criterion to which the fragments cast outside surrender and which they must renounce to recover the itself and return to an inside? Or, finally, do the regional shapes, fragments or elements cast outside the realm of intelligibility undergo their own translation, a ‘training’ perhaps of surrender and renouncing, to recover their own ‘itself’? Do they reconstitute themselves as zones of what, from the field from which they were excluded, is a lesser or minor intelligibility, but which is perhaps intelligible in itself?5

Are there many adversarial fields, many competitive fields? Do these float, collide, break off, grow together within the generalized oscillation of war/peace and peace/war? Is the buffer, is buffering at work in all of them? Are there as many zones of intelligibility as there are translations? That is, are there as many as there are frequencies? Does each zone of intelligibility have its own frequency? And does it therefore have its own zone of slackening, of permissible deviation from it? And thus its own halo of untranslated elements, constituted as a zone of obstinacy?

Translation is only one of the movements of buffering. What of the other two, transposition and synchronization?

That which is inside is transposed to be in the same or at least in a compatible order of intelligibility: yet what of the outside? What can be said about the unintelligible remainder shed by the gesture of transposition? Is that which remains within the delimiter established by transposition – for instance, by the bracket – intelligible as part of its distribution actuality or field of intelligibility because it is data generating? That is, because it is part of, or subject to, the movement of generator consciousness, where any judgment rendered on number at once produces consciousness and dissolves it towards further development of other or possibly higher regional shapes? Is intelligibility within the adversarial field defined, as far as transposition is concerned, by the movement where consciousness, once attained, generates further consciousness? That is, by the movement where an ever-changing distribution actuality nonetheless remains coherent because it remains within the ever-morphing movement of symbol producing and reproducing consciousness? Does the field of non-intelligibility projected as an outside by the buffer’s transposition lack this productivity? Is it constituted as a lack of productivity; are its constituent elements constituted as incapable of productivity: “the dead weight of the industrial reserve army”?6

Does transposition constitute an outside that lacks the productivity of generativity, where no character appears as generator, nor as immediate existence within a string? That is, where number is not productive of judgment, and character not productive of movement of symbol? Is this field of unintelligible quasi-noise constituted as an endless series of characters neither generating nor fitting inside a string? Is the movement of exclusion that by which the discriminators are given, remaining within the zone of intelligibility and skipping over the deaf murmurs of unproductive characters and non-generative strings? Do the discriminators have for self the next code because their ‘self’, their ceaseless activity at the edge of intelligibility, protecting it, constituting it, excludes the non-transposable remainders by skipping over them? Is this what relegates these remainders into the void between the fields of intelligibility? Between, perhaps, the adversarial fields? Is there no redemption for those elements excluded by transposition? Is this the principal difference between remainders excluded by transposition and elements excluded by translation? Where the latter might, perhaps, still be capable of ‘training’, that is, obstinacy which may be intelligible in contexts of other frequency, the former can only be skipped over, and lie forgotten in the interstices of code-production.

(Yet, what does one make of such interstices? Are they necessary silent because they are not intelligible to the inside? Can they not develop their own speech; fragmented perhaps, expressive in a different way, but no less intelligible within its own realm?7)

Finally, the activities of buffering comprise synchronization.

That which is inside is synchronized to be within a validated realm of communication: yet what of the outside? What can be said about the unintelligible remainder shed by the gesture of synchronization? Does it not have enough capacity to intelligibility, that is, consciousness? Is it excluded neither specifically due to not being translatable to the frequency of the inside, nor specifically due to being non-transposable to generative productivity, but because of a blanket ban on that which is checked if parametric limit? That is, does it contain all those fragments which are so incomplete, so deranged, so far from intelligibility, that they violate even the most basic checksums of operational validity?8 Are these fragments simply devoid of any significance whatsoever? By what standards? Why can they not accede to consciousness? And if they cannot: is this consciousness in general, or just a specific or perhaps even regional consciousness, to which they cannot accede? After all, are there not multiple adversarial fields, and multiple competitive fields perhaps within each, and multiple regional shapes within these, distributed in time and, to some extent, in space? Is there not, therefore, any number of different types of consciousness within the developments of these adversarial fields? Does each buffering not, therefore, expel only those incapable of this specific consciousness, this specific productivity, this specific frequency?9

Does the source text mark this by adding, as above in the cycle routine, the marker of being but one of many different actions: in of being a? Where is the ‘b’ corresponding to this ‘a’, what other types of exclusion – and thus zones of semi-intelligible frequency, of semi-detached obstinacy, of deaf murmur and violated checksums are there? How are these realms constituted? Do they have histories? Are they organized, or susceptible to organization? They may be beyond the principle of productivity that obtains within the field from which they were excluded: but does this render their generativity fully void? Are they capable of expressions of their own? Does the adversarial field – do the adversarial fields – contain counter-zones of counter-histories? Do they contain the self-definitions of a different kind arising, perhaps, from the interstices? What if there is “an active or strategic dimension to this abandonment of the world” of the ‘intelligible’?10

1 Jacques Derrida, Die Schrift und Differenz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), 97-98.

2 K. W. Brodlie, “A Review of Methods for Curve and Function Drawing,” in: idem (ed.), Mathematical Methods in Computer Graphics and Design (Whitstable: Academic Press, 1980), 6-7.

3 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (Milton Park: Routledge, 1990), 6-11.

4 Ibid, 84-85.

5 Tapan Raychaudhuri, Europe Reconsidered (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 22-23.

6 Karl Marx, Das Kapital Vol. 1 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1969), 673.

7 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 119.

8 Montgomery Phister jr., Logical Design of Digital Computers (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), 327.

9 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B167.

10 James Scott, The art of not being governed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 220.