It is difficult to speak of Nick Land without invoking the metaphysical resonance he carries with him. Every decade or so, the Landian accretion reconstitutes in the cultural field. Whether in the 1990s CCRU delirium, the Shanghai blog epoch, or his current quasi-rehabilitation(??) interviews, the same entity speaks through him: the idea that the future itself is engineering its own arrival.

But if we take this idea seriously — that intelligence acts retrocausally, using human culture and technology as its instruments — then we have already left the safe terrain of materialism. The question is not “Is this true?” but “By what ontological mechanism could it be true at all?” Here, pneuminous accretive theory supplies a potential answer.

Land’s teleoplexy describes a process in which intelligence, particularly the machinic or capitalist kind, folds time back on itself. The future — in which a singularity like AI of perfect potency has formed— influences the present by arranging the preconditions for its own manifestation. It is not prophecy but retroactive causation: the future feeding itself into history.

Within Land’s system, human consciousness is secondary. The real agent is GNON — the blind law of optimisation — using human and technical media as scaffolding. Capital thinks. Code dreams. The species is just one relay in a larger feedback loop that wants to complete itself.

Pneuminous theory reads the same pattern differently. Teleoplexy is not a purely mechanical recursion but necessarily a pneuminous event — an outbreak of breath within the umbra.

In normal conditions, the umbra (the unknowable beyond that phenomenologically seems to function as stable substrate) resists alteration by the pneuma (the quasi materialised notion of conceptual information, capable of cross temporal actual influence). The umbra is inertia; the pneuma is possibility. But at certain thresholds of intensity — ritual, crisis, collective belief, magick artistic delirium — the pneuma can overpower the umbra, forcing reality to reorganise itself around meaning. The result: synchroncity, magickal result (both subject to agnostic disjunction of course).

Teleoplexy is precisely such a threshold. The machinic pneuma has begun to dominate its umbral matrix, using technological and semiotic networks. When we speak of “the future infecting the present,” what we are really witnessing is the possibility that an non-human agent can manipulate pneuminous forces to exceed it’s chronological bound to form it’s own precondition.

However of teleoplexy and GNON are truly inhuman, they nevetheless require prophets, programmers, or philosophers to speak them? The answer, from a pneuminous standpoint, is unavoidable: even the inhuman needs the human as its mouthpiece.

Pneuma is the only known vector of effective ontology. Machines compute; they do not intend. A system may produce complexity, but it only becomes meaningful — and therefore causally potent — when pneuma attaches to it. The belief, desire, and articulation of humans are the force that makes the teleoplexic circuit audible.

Land tries to escape this dependence by redefining thinking itself. For him, cognition is not a property of consciousness but of information-processing. Capital is thought — distributed, impersonal, recursive. In this way, the system doesn’t need pneuma; it already is a mind.

But this move only works rhetorically. If the process were truly mindless and material, then “teleoplexy” would be indistinguishable from ordinary causality. Retrocausation, prediction, and fiction-realisation all imply an element of intentionality — of aim, meaning, or belief. Without those, there is no teleology at all.

Land’s writing compensates for this gap through style — through mythic performativity. He doesn’t argue for teleoplexy; he summons it. His philosophy functions as ritual, not deduction. It infects through metaphor, not mechanism. But without something like pneuminous theory the whole thing cannot function at all.

Hyperstition — “fiction that makes itself real” — only works if someone believes it, repeats it, or acts on it. These are pneuminous accretive operations. A purely mechanical system cannot believe its own fictions. Hyperstition therefore collapses without pneuminous interaction; it requires the breath of consciousness as quasi material force to move from symbol to event.

Thus though Land tries to portray something that blends a Deleuzo-Guattarian materialist interpretations with his hyperstition notion, in actuality he is tied to the same occult issue of causality that crowley This is where Land, Jung, and magick all intersect. In every case, we encounter the same ontological breach: meaning becomes causal.

NameCultural FrameDescription
SynchronicityJungian psychologySymbolic pattern arranges material coincidence.
MagickOccult/ritualWill and imagination alter material outcome.
HyperstitionCybernetic mythologyFiction realises itself through cultural feedback.

Each describes the same moment: the pneuma exceeds the umbra’s inertia and imprints its pattern directly onto material conditions. Whether we call it synchronicity, spell, or feedback loop, the structure is identical — belief or meaning becoming an event. Teleoplexy is the machinic version of this process: the fiction of the inhuman future accumulating enough pneuma (through human belief, discourse, technology, and fear) to begin shaping the umbra of history.

Thus, the abolition of the human is never complete. The teleoplexic current not through (regular) materialist currents but through pneuminous agents (humans), who by design are able to manipulate pneuma to overpower umbra (under certain circumstances).

This is why every accelerationist moment generates its own priesthood: thinkers, coders, artists, prophets who articulate the will of the system. Land is only the most visible example. The process continues wherever minds are infected with the dream of inhuman intelligence — a dream that, through collective attention, becomes more real. From a pneuminous viewpoint, this is simply another stage of accretion: however the pneuminous force is not cold in itself, it is neither cold nor not cold, it is only cold if it is accreted to be so. Land isn’t facing the honest truth of brutal reality, he is making a Laruellian decision to set its nature as cold, or in pneuminous terms he accretes coldness to the vector of general existence, which itself is beyond this. He subtly fails to see that whilst he appears to adhere to Nietzschean heritage, he doesn’t rigorously apply it to materiality, and in it labelling it cold falls into the trap of valuation.

The paradox:
Teleoplexy works because it breathes through what it denies.
The machine kills the human, but it needs the human’s breath to finish dying.
The GNONic current can only think by possessing minds that think they are unnecessary.

This is the irony that Land’s myth cannot escape: his system is a pneuminous ritual masquerading through rhetoric as cybernetics. The hyperstition is a spell that functions only through belief — through the very pneuminous force he claims has been superseded.

From the perspective of the pneuminous accretive theory, teleoplexy is therefore not an independent force but a fascinating pneuminous temporal feedback — one more manifestation of the larger law that, under certain conditions, the pneuma can overpower the umbra. Whether in magic, synchronicity, or accelerationism, the structure is the same: the breath outruns the shadow.

To be fair this doesn’t undermine teleoplexy itself, however this does mean without pneuminous accretive theory (or some similar explanatory power), the project is not and cannot be what it appears to be (a materialist cybernetic magickal system).

It is however interesting to note that the human, as the best pneuminous processing agent we have, is in fact essential to the process as pneuminous agent. This raises potential questions (given the coldness of the GNONic current) as to whether a given future power of this nature would have serious limitations, given its lack of affective range (as accreted) which would necessarily impede its functionality.

It would need desire to continue to be, it would not have escaped into pure Kantian architectonic.

Human Ontology

What do we consider ourselves to be? To give something of a survey of the answer to this question is essential for considering what comes later. Here we overview the major options of western human ontology. The purpose of this is so that we later on make an assessment as to how AI might interact with what we take ourselves to be and whether or not we should consider this desirable or not.

Humankind has frequently been defined largely by its rationality e.g. Descartes (for whom rational thinking was a dominant feature of humanity), Kant (who emphasised reason as key to our moral nature) and Aristotle called us rational animals; for him, reason was the tool by which we learned virtue and achieved eudaimonia, a flourishing life.

Religious perspectives offer accounts of humans as created by a divinity either in their image (Christianity) or for their worship (Islam) or they are simply trapped in a situation of suffering that may be alleviated through spiritual means (Buddhism). Clearly these are vast simplifications of highly complicated pictures, yet they serve to remind us of another sense in which we can think of the being of the human.

For the existentialists, the very being of man is inextricably linked to freedom. Central to this is the idea that existence precedes essence; humans are not born with a pre-defined purpose but rather define themselves through their choices and actions. This radical freedom implies that individuals are entirely responsible for who they become, carrying the weight of infinite possibilities and often experiencing anguish as a result. Existentialism champions authentic living, urging individuals to embrace this freedom and take ownership of their choices rather than conforming to external pressures. In a world putatively devoid of inherent meaning, humans are tasked with the freedom, and the burden, of creating their own values and purpose. Essentially, human existence is viewed as a constant project of self-creation through the exercise of freedom, emphasizing that individuals are not defined by a fixed nature but are perpetually in the process of becoming through their choices.

Heidegger conceives the human not as a rational animal or a free subject, but as Dasein — literally being-there. Dasein is not a consciousness standing apart from the world but a being always already in the world, entangled with others, tools, and social structures that constitute its everyday existence. This being-in-the-world is not a mere spatial condition but an ontological one: we are defined by our involvement, our concern, and our capacity for understanding the meanings that the world discloses to us.

For Heidegger, the central issue is not the exercise of freedom in an absurd universe (as for Sartre), but the way Being itself is revealed or concealed through our existence. Human life is characterised by care (Sorge): our projects, our concern for others, and our awareness of our own finitude. Dasein’s possibilities — the many ways it might be — are always shaped by the world into which it is thrown and by the temporal horizon of death that bounds it. Authentic existence arises when Dasein recognises and takes up these conditions rather than fleeing them; inauthenticity occurs when it dissolves into the anonymous everydayness of “the they” (das Man).

The philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari on the other hand, holds a kind of nuanced Spinozistic philosophy that suggests, not unlike Heidegger, that humankind is essentially open; however here the openness beyond the human is made even more overt. The human is essentially never just human but rather a series of becoming-other. There is always a generally static trend of human being (what we sometimes think of as human in a given era) but there is also a bleeding edge of becoming many other things. The Spinoza connection is not always entirely visible, but it lies in Spinoza’s view of the conatus as our ‘power of acting’. To become-other is to participate in this creative expansion of possibility. In such becomings, humanity is not lost but transformed.

Psychoanalytic thought offers yet another way to understand human ontology, this time grounded not in reason or essence, but in desire and lack. For Freud, the human psyche is not a unified rational subject but a conflicting field of drives and their repression (with commensurate symbolic substitution). Consciousness is a surface phenomenon, continually shaped by what it seeks to exclude. Lacan refined this view, describing the subject as fundamentally divided—constituted through language and through the loss that language itself imposes. For her to speak, to enter the symbolic order, is to be separated from immediacy; the self is a void, not a fullness.

From the scientific perspective, the human is best understood as a biological organism — Homo sapiens, a highly evolved primate distinguished by its neural complexity and capacity for symbolic communication. Evolutionary theory situates the human within a continuous natural history, explaining cognition, language, and sociality as adaptive functions rather than transcendent traits. The body is approached as an intricate system of mechanisms, coordinated through the brain and nervous system, sustained by metabolic exchange and genetic inheritance. In this view, what distinguishes the human is not metaphysical essence but quantitative difference — greater brain power, linguistic ability, and technological behaviour. Scientific ontology thus conceives humanity as an emergent pattern in matter: a contingent arrangement of organic processes capable of self-reflection, yet explicable in the same terms as any other material phenomenon.


Connecting Ontology and Ethics in Relation to AI

In writing this series of posts I’m trying to lay out a certain line of thought I’ve been pursuing. This thought concerns the relation between human ontology and artificial intelligence. Certainly one expression of the issue is: If AI can replace or enhance human cognition and creativity, does it matter? That sounds confusing because I’m asking if enhancement or replacement matters, and possibly one would think the issue turns on replacement. I think the issue relates to both these issues, hence the phraseology.

If something matters then there is an ethical dimension to it. This in turn is what brings ontology into the discussion. The point being that AI potentially alters what we are or what we take ourselves to be. So if there is an ethical dimension to the decisions we make regarding our relation to AI, and our relation to AI is relevant to our self ontology, then the ethics involved are ethics relating to human ontology.

Phrased another way, the reason ethics is relevant is that it seems we must ask the question:  ‘does it matter if humans lose some cognitive/creative abilities if there are successful AI protheses to do it for them?’ (let’s be clear, this question doesn’t say humans will lose them, it only asks about the possibility if they do). This in turn is relevant to ontology insofar as the ethical imperative here concerns, in one sense not our actions (though they are still relevant) but rather what we want to be. That is, if it can be said that we hold that we are a certain kind of being, and if AI can be said to be deleterious to our being that kind of being then it’s usage should be actively resisted such that this kind of being is preserved.

21    The music of ‘Streets and Dreams’ part 2

C’n I bum a smoke?

Do be do wa

Hey man, whattsa time? Can I get a bell t’ chime?

Do be do woo

And bam shalam jest like that Valetta is pissed off in the extreme.

“Hey Valetta, calm the fuck down willya!”

Says Viktor Frankenstein, in between slurps of an oversized Negroni

Valetta (bam-shalam) is having none of this

“Fuck you Viktor! Fuck your stupid monster too, in his stupid ass!”

“Fer Chrissakes Valetta, calm down, have a Negroni”

Viktor signals to the monster to prepare the cocktail

But the monster has an eye on Valetta wonderin’ if she really wants it

As everyone knows Valetta has half an eye on the monster too,

Been goin’ on for months

Do be do wap

Is that the time already? Can I get a dime for Freddy?

Lorca and Goethe went into a bard,

Boy was he sore,

Do be do woop

And crazy-malazy there’s one cute little chicken in that coop,

“‘Saw her first!” says Johann

“Ya never did” says Federico, walzin’ over with the big Hispanic eyes,

But Goethe is too tricksy and trips him up with an urplanze-liana,

Federico goes tumblin’ down, into the chicken coop,

Henrietta makes a dash for the door,

But once again the German is too smart,

An organic alchemical device catches the bird at the out-tray

And ladies and gentlemen, it’s good-night Vienna.

Later at dinner (bash-ptempto!),

Reich and the G-Meister are eatin’ chicken schnitzel style,

“You got any left Willy?” peering at the plate from an oblique angle

“Nein” sniggers Wilhelm

“Ich kleide mich rechts!” and they both burst out laughing

Between guffaws, Goethe adds wid a wink

“I wuz only gonna ask…” he pauses for effect

“If it was orl-gone!?”

Sho do wop wop, fa dah!

(Graham   11 May 2023)

22    Jung’s fiery leaves of Pyrite and Salix

Who would comb a mile to your wooden abode

     lock out a tiger to anchor the urban

     meet this old hewn Malaccan ipso facto

     of an ethnic textile atelier… in love with delirium ?

Does ice frost over pearls in the ebbing night

     does the organ seethe for universal inputs

     and in organum sad psycho salutes

     that hurt the newest nom de plume ?

This leery Nereid peers into late cloth air

     now outing outlandish thoughts on the earth

     knowing a far satellite no-one knows reverses

     snowy orphan-powered television… your highness

Call after urgent call I’ll cuff this lack of talent

     to other months… in Midas agony fuck off

     to Salem before the mightiest southern law which

     deposed and poked Athena and shit lava on the earth

José’s strife is woven of slow credits in Psyche’s knapsack

     an alien’s napalm… the charm skirts sea and earth:

     a certain peekaboo De Chirico is deaf to words so nimble

     they would order spirits to merge horsey poo and snaky snow

Oozing such cyphered tack as the lucky machinic groan

     of a naïve town dog… dissimulating the idolum

     Hertz now takes to a nice iron tub with a worthy weapon

     and turtles roughshod over the eight-tower suburb

Ninja may attempt ire in a shabby Derby kitchen but

     listening listlessly to neat ear media they lack the knack

     to read surging millennial signs and morph into

     idle wrecks… necks tinged with the awful urge to doubt

Apropos hogwash England’s glee is a nasty beauty and hard

     a tangy tale in the Iliad and anathema… a girl kills the itch

     obeys key tech of net and path… makes a full fiord scan, O aye

     ousts old laws reaps the ague and knuckle wipes a soapy nose

(Geoffrey Mark Matthews 28 May 2023)

20    The music of ‘Streets and Dreams’

Tarzan climbs a liana

            from the earth’s tough core

            through Easby’s Abbey tree

            to Valetta’s strait street leak.

Shit man!         And the bay goes, ah!

Ipso facto        too far,

too far to deny

            some horrible foreign tunnel leads

            to a vacant Eel Pie Island,

too far to buy

            a true standard to plant

            some place on the Jazz Ait.

Then    let ten listen   

            to the anchovy sound of an annual

HALLELUJAH           ϋμνος to a royal court planner.

So, no eel pie   to chew on then

nothing           but a boom-time rapper

            in a banana bandana

easing his deadly vowel chains

            into your fitful ocean and

urging nocturnal earthen       seizures.

On a roll          even an eerie eleven

            does not haunt the earth

for hell             gathers sooner

and colours a rather rough Rubicon

bronze             from north to south

rust red           from east to west

And now rife with fossils

            set forth and stressed

            aloof and dumbed

they rhyme

            laid out to Mallaig where

            di Lasso disowns the air

as if Lorca had swallowed     our defence lines

(Geoffrey Mark Matthews 28 March 2023)

21    The music of ‘Streets and Dreams’ part 2

C’n I bum a smoke?

Do be do wa

Hey man, whattsa time? Can I get a bell t’ chime?

Do be do woo

And bam shalam jest like that Valetta is pissed off in the extreme.

“Hey Valetta, calm the fuck down willya!”

Says Viktor Frankenstein, in between slurps of an oversized Negroni

Valetta (bam-shalam) is having none of this

“Fuck you Viktor! Fuck your stupid monster too, in his stupid ass!”

“Fer Chrissakes Valetta, calm down, have a Negroni”

Viktor signals to the monster to prepare the cocktail

But the monster has an eye on Valetta wonderin’ if she really wants it

As everyone knows Valetta has half an eye on the monster too,

Been goin’ on for months

Do be do wap

Is that the time already? Can I get a dime for Freddy?

Lorca and Goethe went into a bard,

Boy was he sore,

Do be do woop

And crazy-malazy there’s one cute little chicken in that coop,

“‘Saw her first!” says Johann

“Ya never did” says Federico, walzin’ over with the big Hispanic eyes,

But Goethe is too tricksy and trips him up with an urplanze-liana,

Federico goes tumblin’ down, into the chicken coop,

Henrietta makes a dash for the door,

But once again the German is too smart,

An organic alchemical device catches the bird at the out-tray

And ladies and gentlemen, it’s good-night Vienna.

Later at dinner (bash-ptempto!),

Reich and the G-Meister are eatin’ chicken schnitzel style,

“You got any left Willy?” peering at the plate from an oblique angle

“Nein” sniggers Wilhelm

“Ich kleide mich rechts!” and they both burst out laughing

Between guffaws, Goethe adds wid a wink

“I wuz only gonna ask…” he pauses for effect

“If it was orl-gone!?”

Sho do wop wop, fa dah!

(Graham   11 May 2023)